Domestic Politics and the Decision-Making Process in Turkish Foreign Policy by Bunnenberg, Anne
   
 
 
 
 
 
	
GeT MA Working Paper Series 
	
Domestic Politics and the 
Decision-Making Process  
in Turkish Foreign Policy  
A Case Analysis of AKP’s Strategy in 
Response towards the Islamic State 
 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018 
No. 14 
GeT MA Working Paper Series  
Department of Social Sciences 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berl in 
Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berl in 
 
www.sowi.hu-berl in.de/getma  
 
info.getma@sowi.hu-berl in.de 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G       
 
2 | 
 
GET MA WP 14/2018 
GeT MA Working Paper Series 
Published by the German Turkish Masters Program of Social Sciences (GeT MA), 
Department of Social Sciences at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
Papers in this series are the final theses of GeT MA graduates. Publication in this series does 
not preclude a later publication elsewhere. 
The views expressed in the GeT MA Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do 
not necessarily reflect those of the GeT MA Program or of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
The copyright stays with the author(s).  
Copyright for this paper: Anne Bunnenberg 
Please cite in the following format:  
Bunnenberg, Anne (2018): Domestic Politics and the Decision-Making Process in Turkish Foreign Policy. A Case 
Analysis of AKP’s Stategy in Response towards the Islamic State. GeT MA Working Paper No. 14, Department of 
Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. [online] Homepage: Edoc Server Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
URL: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/getmaseries 
Corresponding authors:  
Anne Bunnenberg, Master of Social Science, German Turkish Masters Program, Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin.  
In her graduate study, Anne Bunnenberg focussed on Turkish Foreign Policy and Islam’s influence on politics. 
Migration and Nation-Building were two important topics in these areas for her. Currently, she is working for a 
major German educational provider as a coordinator for intergration projects for refugees and immigrants in 
Berlin.  
 
GeT MA Working Paper Series  
Department of Social Sciences 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berl in 
Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berl in 
 
www.sowi.hu-berl in.de/getma  
 
info.getma@sowi.hu-berl in.de 
  A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G  
 
| 3 
 
GET MA WP 14/2018 
Domestic Politics and the Decision-
Making Process in Turkish Foreign Policy  
A Case Analysis of AKP’s Strategy in Response 
towards the Islamic State 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G  
 
Bei der Analyse spezifischer außenpolitischer Entscheidungen wurden innenpolitische Faktoren lange Zeit 
vernachlässigt; stattdessen wurde vornehmlich das internationale System betrachtet. Mit Ende des Kalten 
Krieges bildeten sich neue Forschungsansätze, welche vermehrt innenpolitische Faktoren in die Analyse ein-
bezogen. Das durch den Syrischen Bürgerkrieg entstandene Machtvakuum ermöglichte es dem Islamischen 
Staat (IS) sich in Syrien und im Irak auszubreiten. Aufgrund weltweiter Terroranschläge des Islamischen 
Staates bildete sich eine von den USA geführte Anti-IS Koalition. Die Türkei trat der Koalition bereits im Sep-
tember 2014 bei, verstärkte jedoch etwa erst ein Jahr später nach einem Terroranschlag in Suruç ihre Be-
mühungen im Kampf gegen den IS. Unter Bezugnahme auf Realismus und Liberalismus als theoretisches 
Fundament geht diese Arbeit der Frage nach, inwieweit das internationale System oder innenpolitische Fak-
toren zum Wendepunkt der türkischen Außenpolitik geführt haben. Es muss jedoch festgehalten werden, 
dass sowohl innenpolitische Faktoren als auch externe Umstände im Entscheidungsfindungsprozess zum Er-
gebnis beitragen. Die von vielen Forschern in der Außenpolitikanalyse vorgegebene Trennung zwischen in-
nerstaatlichen Faktoren und dem internationalen System sollte daher in zukünftiger Forschung aufgebrochen 
werden. 
Stichworte: Türkei, Außenpolitik, Innenpolitik, Realismus, Liberalismus, Islamischer Staat, AKP 
In the analysis of foreign policy decisions, domestic politics have been neglected for a long time. Scholars 
have focused on the international system as the main source of explanation. After the end of the Cold War, a 
new paradigm within International Relations emerged and domestic factors are increasingly included in ex-
plaining foreign policy. The onset of the Syrian civil war enabled Islamic State to expand its power in Syria 
and Iraq. Worldwide terrorist attacks carried out by IS have led to the establishment of an anti-IS coalition 
headed by the USA. Although Turkey has been a member of that coalition since September 2014, the AKP-
government stepped up its fight against IS only after the Suruç bombing about one year later. By referring 
to realism and liberalism as the theoretical foundation, this paper aims at exploring which factors have 
caused this shift in Turkish foreign policy towards IS: domestic politics or the international system. As only 
one result, it is to be assumed that both domestic politics and external factors have played a role in Turkey’s 
decision-making process. The thesis at hand argues that this clear boundary between domestic politics and 
external factors in explaining a state’s foreign policy should be loosened in future research.  
Keywords: Turkey, foreign policy, domestic politics, realism, liberalism, Islamic State, AKP 
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1. Introduction  
‘Turkey, a key member of NATO, has so far chosen to sit out the war against ISIS.’ 
(Totten 2015: 5) Apart from that, international media and in particular pro-Kurdish 
parties have even accused the current government of supporting Islamic State (IS)1 in 
various ways. The Turkish President Erdoğan vehemently rejected these accusations: 
‘Daesh is not a representative of Islam. Daesh is a terrorist organization that casts a 
shadow, a dark pall over Islam. We could never take sides with Daesh.’ (N.A. 2016b) 
Although Turkey has been a member of the US-led anti-IS coalition since September 
2014, the government took only much later an active role in combating IS. Notably the 
USA has exerted enormous pressure on Turkey to intensify its fight against the IS. 
‘Claims that Turkey does not condemn Daesh terrorist acts or has not launched any 
operations against its members are totally false’, Turkey's presidential spokesman 
Ibrahim Kalin opposed. (N.A. 2015a)  
On 20 July 2015, a suspected IS suicide bomber attacked a group of pro-Kurdish 
activists in Suruç, who had planned to travel to Syria in order to help reconstructing 
the Syrian town of Kobane. This was the first time that Turkey responded by launching 
airstrikes against IS bases which is why the Suruç bombing is regarded as the tuning 
point of Turkish foreign policy towards IS. (Zeldin, 2015: 1) Although the Suruç 
bombing constitutes the largest attack on Turkish soil back then, it was not the first 
time that IS targeted Turkish citizens. (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 21) 
Unlike the attacks in Paris or Brussels, IS has never claimed responsibility for any 
terrorist attack in Turkey. According to scholars such as Groll and de Luce, IS does not 
comment on its attacks on Turkish soil because it ‘(…) paves the way for Ankara to 
potentially blame the attack on its Kurdish adversaries.’ (Groll/de Luce 2016). Since 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) foundation in the late 1970s, tensions in the 
relationship between the Turkish state and the PKK have resulted in repeating armed 
clashes in south-eastern Turkey. In the beginning of 2015, Syrian-based Kurdish forces 
that are affiliated with the PKK gained significant territory against IS in northern Syria. 
(ibid.) After the Suruç bombing, Turkey not only targeted IS, but also launched 
                                           
 
1 Grammatically, the term Islamic State is in need of an article. Yet, the thesis at hand does not regard IS as a state. For this reason, no article 
will be applied in the following when using the term Islamic State/IS. Before assuming the designation IS, the militant group had adopted the 
names ISIS and ISIL; moreover, it is sometimes referred to as Daesh/Deash. To simplify, the terms ISIS/ISIL and Daesh/Deash, when quoted in 
this thesis, will not be replaced by the current self-designation. 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G       
 
10 | 
 
GET MA WP 14/2018 
airstrikes against PKK bases. (Kanat/Ustun 2015: 90) Therefore, it is to be expected 
that the Kurdish issue played a role in Turkey’s foreign policy shift towards IS. 
However, due to the limited scope of the thesis at hand, a historical review cannot be 
provided.  
Because these terror attacks carried out by IS also threaten Turkey’s domestic 
security, the fight against IS cannot be regarded as a pure foreign policy issue. On 
closer examination of Turkish domestic politics and its foreign policy, it can be 
presumed that many events on the domestic level have a direct influence on 
governmental foreign policy decisions. Consequently, it is necessary to take into 
account domestic politics in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards IS.  
As a result of the democratisation process that was initiated by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), the Turkish government has become more sensitive to 
public constraints. The scholar Walker argues that ‘(…) civilian leaders cannot ignore 
where public opinion stands on critical foreign policy questions as easily as the military 
leaders that previously dominated Turkish foreign policy decision-making.’ (Walker 
2011: 10) Yet, under the rule of the AKP, Turkish society has transformed sustainably 
and is marked by a growing political polarization that runs along the lines of being 
either for or against the ruling party. (Göğüş/Mannitz 2016: 19) This can be explained 
by the fact that the AKP has taken increasingly measures to supress dissenting political 
opinions: ‘With state and government working to culturally and morally homogenise 
the population, the democratisation deployed to break the power of the secular elite 
has been replaced by a new authoritarianism, this time in the guise of conservative 
religious identity.’ (Seufert 2014: 3) 
All in all, the thesis at hand raises the question whether the shift in Turkey’s foreign 
policy towards IS was caused either by domestic politics or by pressures from the 
international system. The analysis will be driven by two main assumptions. Firstly, it is 
predicted that Turkey’s foreign policy is highly influenced by international actors, 
notably the USA, which constitutes Turkey’s most important ally in security issues. As 
a second assumption, this thesis argues that domestic constraints increased and 
triggered the strategical shift in Turkey’s foreign policy towards IS. The AKP-
government faces growing domestic pressure and responds by excluding opposition 
forces from the decision-making process.  
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In the light of the given assumptions, both realism and liberalism will provide the 
theoretical foundation. Most importantly for the guiding question of this paper, realism 
and liberalism differ in weighting the role of domestic politics in the decision-making 
process of foreign policy. ‘In essence, liberalism and realism offer different basic 
postulates in understanding the nature of international politics.’ (Dugis 2009: 171) For 
liberals, domestic aspects such as the form of government and inner-state structures 
are the main driving forces in the formulation of foreign policy. In contrary, realists 
regard the self-centred nature of human beings and the anarchic international system 
as the primary source of explanation for foreign policy decisions. 
The thesis at hand is subdivided into four major parts. The first chapter provides the 
main guidelines of liberalism and realism. Special attention will be paid to the opposing 
understandings of domestic and international politics. For each theory, one 
representative and his main ideas will be analysed: Norrin M. Ripsman represents the 
school of neoclassical realism and Joe. D. Hagan offers a liberal approach in analysing 
foreign policy. 
The second chapter is dedicated to the methodology. In order to examine the two 
levels of analysis – domestic politics and international system – this thesis relies on 
process tracing (PT). This approach allows to follow these two paths with the aim of 
detecting whether domestic politics or the international system have caused the shift in 
Turkish foreign policy.  
The main contextual factors of both domestic politics and foreign policy will be 
explored in the third chapter. By providing the necessary background information, this 
chapter represents the grounding for the case study. It is central for the investigation 
to introduce the main guidelines of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and in 
particular its stance towards Syria. This includes an analysis of Turkey’s 
counterterrorism strategies towards IS and the PKK. With regard to the domestic level, 
the scope in which media and civil society can operate as a mouthpiece of Turkish 
public will be explored. In this context, it is of vital importance to examine domestic 
constraints that the government may face in its decision-making process.  
The last chapter of this thesis seeks to explain the shift in Turkish foreign policy by 
applying the methodological approach of PT. From each level of analysis – domestic 
politics and international system – three hypotheses will be tested in the context of PT. 
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Similar to a criminal investigation, the given items of evidence will be collected and 
evaluated with the purpose of explaining the outcome in question. 
The current state of research does not offer a wide spectrum of analyses and articles. 
Most known in this field is the scholar Robert Putnam who established the two-level 
game theory. In the introduction of his article Diplomacy and Domestic Politics - The 
Logic of Two-Level Games, he criticizes that ‘[d]omestic politics and international 
relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the 
puzzling tangle.’ (Putnam 1988: 427) According to Putnam, political decision makers 
have to negotiate not only in the international arena, but also on the domestic level. In 
general terms, most studies analysing the decision-making process of foreign policy 
hail from the USA. After the Second World War, prominent realists such as George 
Kennan and Hans Morgenthau focused on explaining a state’s foreign policy by 
referring to the international system. (Morgenthau 1948, Kennan 1954) With the end 
of the Vietnam War and the rising globalisation of international markets, the 
importance of domestic politics in foreign policy research in the field of international 
relations (IR) grew. Although realism used to dominate the scientific discourse in 
explaining foreign policy, the role of domestic politics started to appear in many 
academic studies.2 In particular liberal theories include domestic factors in explaining 
foreign policy decisions. In the realist tradition, a new stream − called neoclassical 
realism − emerged in the 1990s and includes domestic aspects as well. (Rose 1998). 
Although many scholars discuss the relation between domestic politics and foreign 
policy, the current research lacks case studies in which these theories have been 
applied.  
Since the AKP came to power, international researchers have become increasingly 
interested in Turkish politics. Many studies concerning the AKP’s style of leadership and 
its economic performance have been published recently. Among them are several 
analyses of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, in particular focusing on the 
era after the Arab Spring. Yet, studies on Turkey’s foreign policy towards IS are few. 
Those available mainly emphasise the Kurdish issue instead of investigating Turkish 
politics towards IS in detail. The current research also suffers from a lack of primary 
                                           
 
2 For further studies: 1) Adomeit, Hannes / Boardmann, Robert (1979), Foreign Policy Making in Communist Countries. A Comparative Approach, 
Farnborough; 2) Wallace, William / Paterson, William E. (1978), Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe. A Comparative Approach, Farnbor-
ough. 
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sources: Turkish governmental websites publish official speeches, statements and 
press releases only partly. Many statements by Turkish officials applied in this thesis 
were printed in Turkish state-run newspapers. By referring to the current state of 
research, the thesis at hand constitutes a fruitful case study in order to contribute to 
the current research discourse not only on Turkish politics, but also on domestic-state 
relations. 
2. The Theoretical Foundation - Domestic Politics and 
Foreign Policy in Realism and Liberalism 
‘We all know about interaction; we all understand that international politics and 
domestic structures affect each other.’ (Gourevitch 1978: 882) Already in 1978, the 
scientist Peter Gourevitch highlighted the interplay between domestic politics and 
foreign policy. Nevertheless, during the Cold War, realism dominated the political 
discourse on foreign policy and gradually was challenged by liberal theories. Realism 
and liberalism are in a relationship of mutual tension, especially in terms of the role of 
domestic politics in foreign policy. Thus, it is beneficial to refer to the rivalling 
approaches of realism and liberalism in order to establish competing hypotheses in the 
examination of Turkish foreign policy towards IS.  
The first part of this chapter describes the main ideas of realism and, besides, 
introduces neoclassical realism – a theoretical stream that includes domestic factors in 
the analysis of foreign policy. In order to provide an example, the theoretical approach 
by the neoclassical realist Norrin M. Ripsman will be presented. In a second step, this 
chapter explores the guidelines of liberalism as a counter theory to realism. 
Accordingly, the concept of Joe D. Hagan as one of the representatives of liberalism 
will be illustrated.  
2.1 The Classical Approach of Foreign Policy Analysis: Realism 
2.1.1 From (Neo-)Realism to Neoclassical Realism 
In the 1990s, the school of realism was regarded as an outdated heritage of the Cold 
War that needed to be overcome. In the middle of the 1990s, the scientific Ethan 
Kappstein published an article posing the question Is Realism Dead?, in which he 
states that ‘(…) realism must be viewed as deeply and perhaps fatally flawed.’ 
(Kappstein 1995: 751) Nevertheless, realism remains one of the cornerstones of IR 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G       
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theories and experiences a comeback in the current research discourse of foreign 
policy analysis. 
Since (neo-)realism is one of the two theories applied to discuss weather domestic 
politics or the international system influenced Turkish foreign policy towards IS, this 
chapter will provide an introduction to the main guiding ideas. Special attention will be 
paid to its sub-discipline neoclassical realism that in contrast to classical approaches of 
realism, includes domestic politics in analysing foreign policy. This chapter’s aim is not 
to present the concept of (neo-)realism and neoclassical realism as a whole but rather 
to explore the role of 1) domestic politics and 2) the international system in the 
process of decision-making. 
The school of realism consists of two main branches: classical realism and neorealism. 
Classical realism entered the field of IR in the middle of the 20th century as a counter 
theory to idealism that had dominated the political discourse since the First World War. 
The most influential representatives of classical realism include inter alia Edward 
Hallett Carr (1939), Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1948) and John Herz (1951). Classical 
realism emerged in response to the political environment triggered by the Second 
World War, which was marked by an extreme totalitarianism and an aggressive 
nationalism. In this regard, classical realists blame especially the failures of the 
interwar diplomacy, for instance the collapse of the League of Nations (LN). (Freyberg-
Inan 2004: 67)  
With regard to political context back then, the research focus is on explaining conflicts 
between states. Classical realists base their theory on the assumption that a state’s 
behaviour derives from the human nature itself. In the words of Morgenthau, ‘politics 
(…) are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.’ 
(Morgenthau 1948: 4)  
The human nature is viewed as egoistic and self-centred, which contributed to the 
realist’s pessimistic concept of humankind. The overall aim of any human being is to 
gain power, which ‘(…) is an element of all human associations, from the family 
through fraternal and professional associations and local political organizations, to the 
state.’ (ibid.: 39) Classical realists attribute the emergence of conflicts between states 
to the immutable aspiration of human beings to dominate others. (Freyberg-Inan 
2004: 67)  
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Classical realists not only refuse any decisive role of domestic politics in foreign policy, 
they are also sceptical about the contribution of the public to foreign policy. (Dugis 
2009: 178-179) Due to the fact that successful foreign policy is in need of secrecy and 
flexibility, classical realists tend to neglect or exclude the role of domestic public 
opinion in the formulation of foreign policy. The people are mainly concerned about 
domestic issues that are rather related to their daily lives than foreign issues. The 
scholar Morgenthau emphasizes this point by stating that ‘(…) the rational 
requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of 
a public whose preferences are emotional rather than rational.’ (Morgenthau 1978: 
558) The scholar Ole Holsti adopts this view and adds that an active role of the public 
implies that the emotional is allowed to govern the rational which may harm the 
stability of democracies and/or especially the international system. (Holsti 1992: 440) 
The concept of neorealism, also known as structural realism, was introduced by 
Kenneth N. Waltz during the Cold War in 1979. It agrees with the classical realist 
assumption that power is the decisive variable in a state’s foreign policy behaviour. But 
for neorealists, ‘(…) [the] human nature has little to do with why states want power.’ 
(Mearsheimer 2013: 78) They regard the anarchic structure of the international system 
as the main driving force in the decision-making process of foreign policy. (Bode/da 
Costa/Diez 2011: 180) In the neorealist context, anarchy describes the absence of a 
supranational authority endowed with sanction instruments. (Waltz 1979: 118)  
As only one consequence, states constantly compete for power which is defined as 
material and/or economical capabilities. The more power a state possesses, the better 
its position is in the international system. In other words: ‘(…) [T]he more powerful a 
state is relative to its competitors, the less likely it is that it will be attacked.’ 
(Mearsheimer 2013: 80). This results in the assumption that the anarchic structure of 
the international system forces states to strive constantly for power in order to ensure 
their survival. ‘The distribution of capabilities is unequal and shifting, defining the 
relative power of the states and predictive of variation in balance of power behaviour.’ 
(Arora 2011: 7) According to neorealists, as the most profitable strategy, states tend 
to balance each other in order to ensure their survival. (Donnelly 2009: 37) 
Any shift in the balance of power within the international system leads to a security 
dilemma, which occurs because ‘(…) any country that improves its position in the 
global balance of power does so at the expense of the other states, which lose relative 
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power.’ (Mearsheimer 2013: 80) This may result in a security competition as it was the 
case during the Cold War in the form of a military and nuclear arms race between the 
USA and the then-Soviet Union. (ibid.: 80)  
In general terms, classical realism and neorealism can hardly be distinguished. The 
emergence of neorealism does not constitute a clear cut within the classical realist 
tradition. Both theories emphasize that foreign policy has to be analysed under the 
premise of power relations between states and that national interests are the main 
guideline in the formulation of foreign policy. ‘This seems to allow them to cut through 
utopian political rhetoric and to focus on the realities of the situation.’ (Elias/Sutch 
2007: 42) The state is regarded as a unitary actor that decides on a rational basis with 
the predominant aim to gain power.3 This leads to a second important point: (Neo-
)realists strictly distinguish between domestic politics and foreign policy. In this sense, 
the ministry of foreign affairs − as a unitary actor − deals with foreign policy issues; 
likewise, domestic issues are handled by the interior, labour or other such 
departments. (Durfee/Rosenau 2000: 85) Both theories only differ in the outcome of 
their political directives: ‘Realism leads to power-oriented strategies with power as an 
end in itself. Neorealism leads to security-oriented strategies based in the need to 
compete for security.’ (Arora 2011: 7) 
In the tradition of the realist school, a new wave of realist thinking emerged in the 
1990s, called neoclassical realism, which not only focuses on the international system 
but rather includes domestic explanation factors. Its most known representative is 
Gideon Rose, who contributed to its rising international acknowledgement with his 
article Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy in 1998. In summary, 
‘[n]eoclassical realism builds upon the complex relationship between the state and 
society found in classical realism without scarifying the central insight of neorealism 
about the constraints of the international system.’ (Lobell/Ripsman/Taliaferro 2009: 
13) By including domestic politics in the analysis of foreign policy, neoclassical realism 
offers a new approach in the tradition of realist theories. (e.g. Rose 1998, Schweller 
2004, Zakaria 1998; Wohlforth 1993, Ripsman 2009) ‘This turn is ironic since realism 
                                           
 
3 Especially neorealism focuses on the state as a rational and the unitary actor in world politics, for further information: Keohane, Robert O. 
(1984), After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton.  
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was instrumental in advancing the division between the international and domestic 
realms of politics.’ (Kaarbo 2015: 203)  
While analysing a state’s foreign policy behaviour, neoclassical realists place primacy 
on the international system although domestic factors are significant in exploring the 
decision-making process. (Kaarbo 2015: 203) In accordance with the (neo-)realist 
approach, neoclassical realists defend the idea of an anarchic international system in 
which states are the main actors whose priority is to gain security. (Ripsman 2009: 
174) ‘Neoclassical realism presents a top-down conception of the state, which means 
systemic forces ultimately drive external behaviour.’ (Lobell/Ripsman/Taliaferro 2009: 
25) 
In neoclassical realism, relative power − a state’s power in relation to another state − 
constitutes the decisive variable in explaining foreign policy. (e.g. Zakaria 1998, 
Wohlforth 1993) Hence, proponents of neoclassical realism suggest that a theory ‘(…) 
should first ask what effect the international system has on national behaviour, 
because the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international 
relations is its relative position in the international system.’ (Zakaria 1998: 482) The 
scholar Rose urges that the impact of relative power may in some cases not be that 
obvious, even not for the leader himself; a negligence may lead to misguided causal 
explanation attempts of foreign policy. (Rose 1998: 151) From a methodological 
standpoint, ‘(…) by making relative power their chief independent variable, the 
neoclassical realists are forced to choose sides in the perennial debate about just how 
that concept should be defined and operationalized.’ (ibid.: 151) 
The neoclassical realist Wohlforth stresses the fact that any realist investigation has to 
explore both domestic factors and the international system. (Wohlforth 1993: 19) 
Following this approach, Turkey’s relative power in the international system is most 
decisive, however, domestic features are significant in analysing its foreign politics 
towards IS as well. While examining a state’s foreign policy, ‘(…) one must analyse 
how systematic pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables such 
as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structure.’ (Rose 1998: 146) 
Kaarbo equates the state with a filter through which external factors have to pass 
through. (Kaarbo 2015: 203) Giving an alternative picture, the neoclassical realist 
scholar Schweller describes domestic politics as ‘(…) transmission belts that channel, 
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mediate and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (primarily changes 
in relative power).’ (Schweller 2004: 164) 
Since Turkey’s degree of democracy is disputed in the field of political science as well 
as in the current media debate, and due to the fact that the realist school can be seen 
as a product of the Western World4, one may question the applicability of such theories 
to the Turkish system of governing. In this respect, the neorealist Mearsheimer 
stresses that ‘(…) the structure of the international system, not the particular 
characteristics of individual great powers, causes them to think and act offensively and 
to seek hegemony.’ (Mearsheimer 2001: 53) Since the premise of gaining power is the 
primary aim, states are not ‘(…) more or less aggressive on the basis of their economic 
or political system.’ (ibid.: 54) The system of governing does not have any impact on 
the process of decision-making. By giving the same external stimuli, a democratic, 
authoritarian or capitalist regime behave in a similar way. (Hutchings 1999: 20)  
In summary, (neo-)realism and neoclassical realism focus less on domestic factors but 
rather on the interpretation of the international system while analysing foreign policy 
decisions. Other disciplines of research such as studies of regional factors or of the 
impact of international organizations are of secondary importance. (Elias/Sutch 2007: 
43) Only neoclassical realism includes domestic politics, yet, the focus is still on the 
international system. From a realist point of view, Turkish foreign policy towards IS is 
above all influenced by the international system.  
2.1.2 Foreign Policy Analysis by the Neoclassical Realist Norrin M. Ripsman 
In order to gain insight into neoclassical realism, this chapter aims at exploring Norrin 
M. Ripsman’s5 ideas on domestic politics and foreign policy. Since he is one of the 
leading scholars in this field, his article Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest 
Groups (2009) will serve as the literary foundation for this chapter. This article was 
chosen because it pays special attention to domestic influences on foreign policy in the 
framework of neoclassical realism. In his article, Ripsman follows the six guiding 
questions 1) who the actors are, 2) who matters most, 3) under which international 
                                           
 
4 The term Western World only serves as a simplification in a geographical sense meaning Europe and the United States. The term does not in-
clude any socio-political or cultural purport. 
5 Norrin M. Ripsman is a Professor of Political Science at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada and one of the leading scholars in the field of 
neoclassical realism. Besides this, in his research he mainly focuses on democracy and national security, postwar peacemaking, constructing re-
gional stability, and the impact of globalization on national security. For further information regarding his person or research: Concordia Universi-
ty (2016), Norrin M. Ripsman, https://www.concordia.ca/artsci/polisci/faculty.html?fpid=norrin-ripsman, 20.06.2016. 
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conditions domestic actors can influence most, 4) under which domestic conditions 
domestic actors can influence most, 5) in which type of state domestic actors influence 
most, and 6) what domestic actors exactly influence. 
Concerning the first question, Ripsman argues that a large number of actors are 
interested in shaping foreign security policy due to different reasons. But only a small 
number of actors have access to the legislature through which they may influence the 
leadership (executive). This mainly includes the public opinion, members of the 
legislature and organized interest groups such as labour unions or trade associations. 
Additionally, depending on inner-state structures, the military or in some cases the 
aristocracy, may have access to the executive. (Ripsman 2009: 180) Although these 
different groups are usually analysed separately, due to their common interest, 
Ripsman suggests to treat them as a whole to generate a theory of domestic political 
influence. (ibid.: 171) 
In a second step, the article examines which of these actors can shape foreign policy. 
Domestic actors must be able to provide a valuable payoff in order to influence a 
state’s foreign policy; in this context, especially electoral support is of great 
importance: Members of the executive ‘(…) should be most receptive to influence from 
domestic actors who can provide or deny electoral support or, in non-democratic 
states, preserve the leader’s position or topple him/her.’ (ibid.: 181). Moreover, 
domestic actors may be successful in shaping foreign policy if they can provide 
resources that may help leaders to stay in power, or in cases of corrupt regimes the 
leader might be open to bribery. ‘Nonetheless, money and resources should be of only 
limited utility, since – unlike direct, coherent electoral clout – they tend to be spread 
across interest groups.’ (ibid.: 183) Due to many countervailing resources offered by 
other domestic groups, bargaining with material resources is not a precondition for 
being successful in influencing foreign policy. (ibid.: 185) Ripsman underlines the 
power of the legislative as another influential domestic actor that is able to obstruct 
the government’s agenda since it can act as a veto player by hampering policies.  
As a third objective, Ripsman analyses under which circumstances domestic actors 
have the greatest influence. In this context, he argues that ‘(…) domestic actors and 
interest groups have the greatest influence over foreign security policy during stable 
periods when the state faces a low-threat international environment.’ (ibid.: 186) 
Accordingly, in times of high external threat that may even lead to war, domestic 
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actors have less influence. Political leaders are able to neglect domestic opposition 
under the premise of the overarching goal to secure the survival of the state. In order 
to provide an example, Ripsman refers to a study by Milbrath6 who argues that during 
the Cold War under the nuclear threat domestic groups had less influence in the USA. 
(ibid.: 186-187) 
Fourthly, Ripsman explores the domestic environment in which domestic actors are 
most successful. According to Ripsman, governmental vulnerability is one of the key 
factors: In the case that a government fears a removal from office, political leaders are 
most willing to bargain with domestic actors over national security policy. Ripsman 
underlines the importance of executive certainty and national consensus. Regarding 
the first objective, he argues, ‘[w]hen the executive is decided about the course of 
national security policy, there is little room for domestic actors with other agendas to 
influence policy choices.’ (Ripsman 2009: 188) Similarly, in case of a national 
consensus over a certain topic, for example the widespread acceptance of the 
containment policy during the Cold War by the American people, other interest groups 
with divergent opinions can hardly intervene. (ibid.: 188) 
In the fifth place, it is questioned which role the form of government plays for the 
decision-making process. In line with the realist approach, the type of regime does not 
matter in this context. Ripsman clearly argues that the degree of a government’s 
autonomy determines to which extent domestic actors may influence the formulation 
of security policies. By applying the term autonomy in this context, Ripsman refers to a 
state’s decision-making environment, meaning prevailing institutional structures, 
procedures and norms. The degree of autonomy not only differs between states, but 
may also change within the same state over time. Irrespective of the type of regime, 
both democracies and non-democracies differ in the degree of autonomy according to 
their position in the international system. (ibid.: 189-190) Thus, Ripsman concludes 
that ‘[a]ll things being equal, the more structurally autonomous an executive is, the 
lesser the ability of domestic actors to interfere with government’s foreign policy 
agenda.’ (ibid.: 189)  
                                           
 
6 For further information on his study: Milbrath Lester W. (1967), Interest Groups and Foreign Policy, in: Rosenau, James N. (ed.), Domestic 
Sources of Foreign Policy, pp. 231-251. 
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Lastly, the object under investigation is what kind of foreign policy decisions domestic 
actors factually can shape. First of all, domestic actors affect the formulation of 
security policies indirectly in the way that they are ‘(…) shaping the interpretation of 
international circumstances and helping define the national interest.’ (ibid.: 185) Once 
more he emphasizes that only when the government does not fear any internal or 
external threat, it may formulate foreign policy strategies based on domestic demands. 
Nevertheless, domestic actors do not shape the formulation of security polices directly, 
they solely may shape the time and style of a state’s foreign policy decision. Ripsman 
describes the nature of influence as follows: ‘(…) [D]omestic interests are unlikely to 
drive decisions of war and peace, but may affect the timing of war and the manner in 
which it is conducted.’ (ibid.: 191) 
In conclusion, according to Ripsman, the influence by domestic actors is limited, 
indirect and linked to preconditions in order to be successful. The international system 
plays the major role in determining a state’s foreign policy ‘(…) but international 
imperatives are filtered through the domestic political environment, which can lead to 
variations in the way states respond to common international pressures.’ (ibid.: 174) 
Therefore, Ripsman’s theory possesses mainly classical neorealist elements but adds 
internal driven aspects in explaining foreign policy decisions; domestic politics may 
determine a state’s foreign policy in functioning as intervening variables. (ibid.: 176) 
2.2 The Theoretical Opponent: Liberalism 
2.2.1 The Liberalist Theoretical Background 
Realism and liberalism differ fundamentally concerning the interpretation of foreign 
policy, hence, this chapter will provide an alternative theoretical approach in order to 
explain Turkish foreign policy. The field of IR offers a wide range of theories, however, 
Kaarbo suggests that ‘[c]urrent liberal theory is perhaps the most logical and expected 
place to find domestic political factors.’ (Kaarbo 2015: 196)  
The liberal tradition comprises a variety of different approaches such as liberal 
intergovernmentalism, (neo-)functionalism or liberal pacifism just to enumerate a few 
of them. Liberal theories not only have to be distinguished from realism, they also 
differ from each other on a systematic level. Viotti and Kauppi describe the process of 
theory building in liberalism as building separate islands of theory that may develop a 
more general theory. (Kauppi/Viotti 2012: 136) This chapter will firstly provide the 
basic ideas of classical liberalism and in a second step the main guidelines of 
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neoliberalism. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, this examination does not raise 
the claim to present a detailed differentiation between the variety of liberal strands.  
In the classical sense, liberalism has its philosophical roots in the European 
enlightenment including key thinkers such as Erasmus, Hugo Grotius and Immanuel 
Kant. After the First World War, liberalism evolved into a separate school of thinking as 
part of IR. In the early years of liberalism, Woodrow Wilson7 became one of the key 
players back then by proposing the LN as part of his fourteen-point plan in the 
aftermath of the First World War. (Daddow 2009: 70) Representatives of the early 
liberalism − such as Woodrow Wilson − sought to establish a peaceful international 
order based on a system of cooperation between nation states. (Chatterjee 2010: 11) 
Overall, the concept of classical liberalism is related to three main topics − human 
nature, war and governance − that will be explored in the following.  
The scholars Jackson and Sorensen describe liberal thinkers above all as optimistic in 
their way of thinking. (Jackson/Sorenson 2016: 98) This is closely linked to their 
positive perception of the human nature: ‘The laws of nature dictated harmony and 
cooperation between peoples.’ (Burchill 2009: 62) Classical liberalists believe in the 
power of human reason and the progress of humankind that will eventually overcome 
wars and conflicts between nation states. (ibid.: 62) The idea of progress is not limited 
to the human nature itself but includes a process of modernization in science, 
technology and economy, which leads to the emergence of global cooperation. 
(Daddow 2009: 70) 
According to classical liberalists − similar to neorealists − the international system is 
marked by an anarchic character, meaning the absence of a superior government. In 
contrast to the neorealist perspective that assumes the emergence of war due to a 
cycle of self-interests and fear of survival, classical liberalists do not evaluate the 
anarchic system as a general risk for war. (Durfee/Rosenau 2000: 35) The nature of 
states is regarded as free and rational and therefore the state ‘(…) for most liberals is 
not naturally one of violence and war.’ (ibid.: 35) Peace and not war is the natural 
condition of international relations. (Daddow 2009: 70) Only in case that a state 
                                           
 
7 Woodrow Wilson is equally connected to the school of idealism. ‘In the history of International Relations, classical liberalism is also referred to 
as idealism, highlighting that this theoretical approach rests upon normative premises (…).’ (Bode, da Costa, Diez, 2011: 180) This is the reason 
why some scholars call the early liberalism utopian liberalism or idealist liberalism. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, this chapter does not 
discuss the similarities of liberalism and idealism. In 2005, Pestritto published a book about Woodrow Wilson calling him the Godfather of liberal-
ism. For further information: Pestritto, Ronald J. (2005), Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, Maryland.  
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becomes subject of a military attack from outside, ‘(…) self-defence and even collective 
defence are permissible activities.’ (Durfee/Rosenau 2000: 35) And even then, 
according to liberals, conflicts in the international area need to be solved through 
international organizations or regimes. (de Mesquita 2010: 9)  
The state is not a rational and unitary actor but rather a coalition of different interests 
represented by individuals and groups of the public. Democracy is the only political 
type of government that can encourage the development of mankind. (Daddow 2009: 
70) ‘Therefore, national interests are determined by which of such many interests 
between individual, groups of individuals, and the public captures government 
authority.’ (Dugis 2009: 171) Accordingly, in classical liberalism, the form of 
government is decisive in explaining a state’s foreign policy. The regime type is 
evaluated on the basis of how states protect the value of human rights; thus, they 
distinguish ‘(…) liberal from non-liberal societies, republican from autocratic or 
totalitarian states, capitalist from communist, fascist, and corporatist economies.’ 
(Durfee/Rosenau 2000: 35) Classical liberalists assume that democracies have less 
conflicts among each other and therefore ‘(…) the best prospect for bringing an end to 
war between states lies with the spread of liberal-democratic governments across the 
globe.’ (Burchill 2009: 62) 
Nevertheless, the form of government alone does not explain a state’s foreign policy 
decision. In this respect, domestic structures are of great importance as a source of 
explanation. As an illustration, Durfee and Rosenau provide two examples. First, if a 
state neglects human rights of its own citizens, that state simultaneously acts 
differently in world politics than a state that protects the international standards for 
human rights. The same applies from an economic point of view: States which are 
eager to open their market to the world economy act differently on an international 
level from those that try to protect their market. (Durfee/Rosenau 2000: 35) Following 
this approach, one should first consider the internal conditions of a state in order to 
analyse a state’s particular decision in foreign policy. A classical liberal foreign policy 
analysis − depending on the form of government and inner state structure− constitutes 
a clear break with the realist tradition. 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G       
 
24 | 
 
GET MA WP 14/2018 
After the Second World War a new wave of liberal theories occurred that in this thesis 
will be collectively gathered under the term neoliberalism8 (e.g. Doyle 1986, Keohane 
1984, Krasner 1983, Niye 1975/1988, Russett 1990, Young 1982). The scholars were 
inspired by the economic developments that had gathered pace since the middle of the 
20th century. Besides this, the increasing number of emerging international institutions 
in the 1970s challenged the research debate back then sustainably. (Daddow 2009: 
96)  
Similar to neorealists, this new wave of liberal thinkers claims that states are the main 
actors in the international system that decide on a rational basis by weighting cost-
benefit calculations. Yet, according to neoliberals, cooperation in an anarchic system is 
possible: States do not just cooperate on the basis of high politics. Under the condition 
of interdependence9, states are not only interested in relative gains (gaining more than 
the other state), but also pursue absolute gains (considering the outcome as a whole). 
(Bode, da Costa, Diez: 2011: 132) The continuing existence of international 
organizations such as the EU or the United Nations (UN) should be understood under 
this premise. ‘It also explains the fact that NATO still is alive and well despite the loss 
of its enemy, the Soviet Union − that is, the cooperation was meaningful and not 
superficial.’ (Durfee/Rosenau 2000: 35)  
In the eyes of neoliberals, the process of modernization and increasing economic 
growth triggers the cooperation through international institutions. The neoliberalist 
Keohane points out that states do not balance but rather tie each other with mutually 
constraining institutions that reduce the importance of military safeguarding. ‘Properly 
designed institutions can help egoists to cooperate even in the absence of a hegemonic 
power. ‘(Keohane 1984: 84) In this context, institutions mean a set of rules in a 
                                           
 
8 The term neoliberalism is normally used synonymously with the terms structural liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism. A few scholars link 
the term neoliberalism particularly to Andrew Moravcsik who introduced the approach of liberal intergouvernmentalism, also called new liberalism 
(also by himself). It should not be confused. Since there has been a new paradigm in IR theory after the Second World War, this thesis uses the 
term neoliberalism in order to describe this development. Therefore, this term includes any liberal theory that has emerged since the 1950s. For 
further information: Daddow, Oliver (2009), International Relations Theory, London.  
9 Especially the scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Niye focused in their research on international cooperation. In 1977, they introduced their 
theory of complex interdependence, also known as neoliberal institutionalism. Basically, Keohane and Niye argue that the structure of the inter-
national system leads to the distribution of capabilities and cooperation between nation states. In contrast to neorealist assumptions, neoliberal 
institutionalists believe that a zero-sum game is not a precondition for cooperation in international relations. Eventually, international cooperation 
between nation-states will reduce the anarchic character of the international system, which will lead to a peaceful world order. (Daddow 2009: 
97) For further information: Keohane, Robert / Niye, Joseph (1977), International Relations Theory. Power and Interdependence, Princeton. 
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specific policy field − such as the Law of the Sea − that shape a state’s behaviour in the 
international system. (Burchill 2009: 66)  
Apart from that, non-economic features influence the cooperation between states. 
‘Cultural norms, or shared values, may also promote cooperation by making clear what 
sorts of behaviour are unacceptable and open to punishment.’ Neoliberalism not only 
focuses on the state-level itself but rather includes cultural aspects that may foster 
cooperation between states. (Daddow 2009: 96) In line with the classical liberal 
assumptions, neoliberal scholars appeal to the further development of humankind that 
is able to create international peace by the greater application of human reasoning. 
(Sterling-Folker 2013: 115) For this reason, neoliberals argue that ‘[n]on-state actors 
are important instruments of this cooperative international order which seeks to 
promote peace, and not conflict, in the world.’ (Chatterjee 2010: 11) 
In conclusion, while the realist school analyses a state’s foreign policy on the basis of a 
top-down model, liberals tend to examine the process of decision-making from an 
inside-out perspective, which marks the main difference between the two schools. 
(Kauppi/Viotti 2012: 139) The neoliberalist Doyle defines a clear demarcation between 
realism and liberalism: ‘(…) [U]nlike realist approaches, liberals tend to focus on 
domestic structures and the individuality of each case (…) and believe that the 
international system has a less than overriding influence and so distinguish themselves 
not only from structural realists but also from all realists.’ (Doyle 2008: 66) By arguing 
from a liberalist point of view, the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy towards IS was driven 
by domestic politics, which constitutes the second assumption of the thesis at hand.  
2.2.2 Domestic Explanation Factors in Foreign Policy Analysis by Joe D. Hagan 
‘The implication is that international politics is driven not solely by systemic structures 
(as posited by realism) but also by the domestic political patterns of at least the major 
powers.’ (Hagan 1995a: 118) Apparently, Joe. D. Hagan10 distances himself from the 
realists’ approach that, as described above, mainly focuses on systemic structures on 
the international level. His theoretical approach shall contribute to the analysis of 
Turkey’s foreign policy strategy towards IS. According to Hagan, each theory that 
                                           
 
10 Joe D. Hagan is a Professor for Political Science at the West Virginia University and mainly teaches courses in foreign policy and IR. In his re-
search career, he focuses on domestic explanation attempts in the decision-making process of foreign policy, especially related to studies on war 
and peace. Methodically, Professor Hagan did many studies on the basis of comparative foreign policy analysis. For further information: West 
Virginia University (2016), Joe D. Hagan, online: http://politicalscience.wvu.edu/faculty-staff/hagan, 20.06.2016. 
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seeks to explore the relation between domestic politics and foreign policy derives from 
the theoretical logic offered by both Robert D. Putnam (two-level games) and Geroge 
Tsebelis (nested games).11 (Hagan 1995a: 121) ‘All that follows is rooted in the basic 
notion that foreign policy makers simultaneously cope with the pressures of domestic 
and international affairs.’ (ibid.: 121) 
This chapter is based on Hagan’s article Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis 
of Foreign Policy, in which he analyses the interplay between domestic politics and a 
state’s political leaders. While dealing with political opponents, a government pursues 
two main aims in the decision-making process of foreign policy. These are building 
coalitions and retaining political power − called twin political games − that will be 
explored first. In a second step, the applied political strategies, called dynamics, 
through which domestic politics shape foreign policy will be discussed.  
The first imperative of building coalitions describes the necessity of every leadership to 
gain domestic support for any introduction of policy initiatives. Political leaders need to 
achieve agreements with the significant actors who are decisive in the process of 
implementation. According to Hagan, two conditions may transport a certain issue into 
the broader political arena. Firstly, a certain issue might be politicized if the decision-
making authority is fragmented among autonomous and powerful actors, for instance 
due to a strong military or a fractional division of the executive. The second condition 
describes the degree of polarization of the involved actors over the issue itself. In this 
sense, the process of decision-making is determined by the need of coalition building 
with the supporting actors in order to implement the initiative. (ibid.: 122) Although 
coalition building predominantly occurs in established Western democracies, yet, 
Hagans emphasizes that coalition building is not only a democratic phenomenon: 
Studies on authoritarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia have shown 
that those former leaders had to face some constraints on the domestic level as well. 
Due to the variety of democratic regime types, the process of coalition building differs 
depending on each system. For instance, in a parliamentary system, the central 
authority is located in the cabinet, therefore, a fragmentation of the cabinet itself may 
                                           
 
11 For further information: Putnam, Robert D. (1988), Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-Level Games, in: International Organi-
zation, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.427-460; Tsebelis, George (1990), Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, California.  
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lead to an inability to act. Taking the case of Turkey, a parliamentary system in which 
the AKP as a single party controls the cabinet through a parliamentary majority, 
according to Hagan, political constraints are less. (Hagan 1995a: 122-123) Thus, 
coalition building is not as necessary as in fragmented cabinets without any 
parliamentary majority.  
The second objective − retaining political power − describes the aim of the ruling 
government to survive politically. ‘Whereas coalition building concerns authority over 
an immediate issue, the longer-term political survival of the ruling group is at the heart 
of the political imperative of retaining power.’ (ibid.: 124) The scholar argues that in 
case domestic constraints jeopardise the continuance in office, foreign policies need to 
be adjusted in order to decrease the domestic pressure. Although not every foreign 
policy issue leads to a potential loss of power, policy makers tend to formulate foreign 
policy decisions with regard to long-term consequences. Two factors are of great 
importance in this context: Firstly, political leaders qualify significant opposition that 
may become a direct challenge for the government, especially if they have ‘(…) 
political resources that indicate they may succeed in the not-too-distant future.’ (ibid.: 
124) Apart from that, political leaders try to act in accordance with the overall 
credibility of the current leadership. For instance, foreign policy strategies such as 
confrontation can be interpreted by the public as a willingness to risk war. Hagan 
underlines this argument by giving an example from the First World War: Due the 
pressure of political survival, leaders joined the war in order to prove their nationalist 
credentials. (ibid.: 124-125) Like the first objective of coalition building, the political 
instrument of retaining political power is not limited to Western democracies. Hagan 
points out that many studies have shown that leaders of authoritarian regimes were 
highly influenced by domestic crises as well. (ibid.: 124-125)  
In a second step, this chapter now explores the political dynamics through which the 
overarching goals of coalition building and/or retaining power can be achieved. In this 
context, the term dynamics means alternative political strategies ‘(…) by which the 
games of building policy coalitions and retaining political power influence foreign 
policy.’ (ibid.: 127) Every political leader responds to domestic opposition in a different 
way, which leads to varying outcomes in foreign policy. He argues that the literature 
offers a variety of approaches on how to link domestic politics to foreign policy and 
suggests to summarize them into three main strategies: 1) accommodation 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G       
 
28 | 
 
GET MA WP 14/2018 
(bargaining and controversy avoidance), 2) mobilization (legitimization of the regime 
and its politics) and 3) insulation (deflecting, suppressing, and overriding opposition). 
The first category accommodation describes the dynamic of a low-risk behaviour, that 
is to say, the strategy of responding to opposition with restraint in foreign policy. 
Leaders try to appease the opposition by avoiding public controversial matters, 
consequently, the strategy consists in preventing any changes in policy setting as well. 
The dynamic of accommodation takes place in both in the process of coalition building 
by bargaining with the significant opposition and with the aim of retaining political 
power. The strategy of accommodation mostly occurs in democratic systems but is not 
limited to Western democratic systems. For instance, studies on the former Soviet 
Union have shown that accommodation was a central dynamic in order to retain 
political power. (Hagan 1995a: 128-129) 
While applying the second dynamic, mobilization, meaning the legitimization of the 
regime and its politics, leaders confront the political opposition by emphasising the 
leadership’s legitimacy. The goal behind this is to control the opposition as well as to 
receive greater support. ‘This strategy is most often associated with the game of 
retaining power in which a leadership manipulates foreign policy issues.’ (ibid.: 129) In 
this context, Hagan refers to studies by Levy (1988), Russett (1990) and Snyder 
(1991) and suggests three main approaches on how a leadership tries to ensure its 
political position: 1) appealing to nationalism (e.g. discussing imperialistic issues as 
well as blaming foreign elements), 2) emphasizing their special capacity or wisdom and 
3) distracting from domestic problems. (ibid.: 129) Due to a lack of political 
institutionalization, the dynamic of mobilization is mostly linked to authoritarian 
regimes. In many of these cases, the political atmosphere is marked by mutual distrust 
that precludes any bargaining process with the opposition. ‘Foreign policy is a 
correspondingly viable means for unifying the public and discrediting domestic 
adversaries.’ (ibid.: 130) 
The third strategy of insulation (deflecting, suppressing, and overriding opposition) 
describes how leaders isolate controversial foreign policy issues from political 
opposition. Hagan points out that leaders are able to bypass domestic constraints 
through a number of political tools such as ignoring domestic challenges, suppressing 
opponents or reaching agreements by promising political favours. When foreign policy 
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issues are the top priority, ‘(…) they are even willing to override strong opponents and 
hope that domestic controversies may be restricted to acceptable levels.’ (ibid.: 131) 
All in all, Hagan suggests that ‘[i]nstead of emphasizing one dynamic or the other (as 
is done in most of the literature); a general theoretical treatment of domestic politics 
must recognize the possibility of both the push and the pull of domestic opposition, as 
well as the fact that domestic pressure might be effectively contained.’ (ibid.: 132) 
Against this background, Hagan underlines the fact that leaders can choose between 
different strategies, thus, the way how a leader deals with the political opposition 
shows how domestic politics shape a state’s foreign policy.  
3. Methodological Approach 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore if the shift in Turkish foreign policy strategy 
towards IS was either influenced by domestic politics or by the international system. 
Therefore, the qualitative method of process tracing is most suitable in following these 
two paths. PT enables to detect causal mechanisms that lead to a certain historical 
outcome.  
In this sense, this analysis is based on a single case research design, yet, by applying 
single case studies it is important to consider their main strengths and weaknesses. 
Single case studies allow a detail-oriented investigation of the single outcome, which 
constitutes the greatest strength. Within the case, several subunits of analysis can be 
included, which provides the opportunity to gain a deeper insight into the case. 
However, applying to several subunits of analysis bears the risk of neglecting the 
larger holistic aspect of the study and the actual topic of the case study might shift. 
(Yin 2009: 52-53) Besides this, another point of criticism focuses on the fact that 
results of single case studies cannot be generalized to other cases. (Van Evera 1997: 
64) 
In order to analyse Turkish foreign policy towards IS, this chapter will present the 
methodological approach on a theoretical basis. In a first step this chapter will offer an 
explanation of the significance of the given case, followed by a detailed 
operationalization of the main concepts applied in the thesis at hand. Hereafter, the 
main idea of PT as well as its strengths and weaknesses will be presented.  
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3.1 Significance of the Case: Turkish Foreign Policy towards Islamic 
State 
‘Turkey has long been accused of turning a blind eye as militants freely crossed its 
territory to fight Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom Ankara seeks to topple.’ 
(Peker 2015) This was stated in April 2015 by Emre Peker in his article Turkey Steps 
Up Its Fight Against Islamic State. Syria and Turkey not only share a common history 
but also a 500-mile long border that for a long time has neither been closed nor 
sufficiently secured, according to Turkey’s allies such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU). (Zeldin 2015: 2) In response, the 
then-PM Davutoğlu contradicted and claimed: ‘Turkey has proved its stance against 
ISIS in the first place, we are the first country that designated ISIS as a terrorist 
organization.’ (N.A. 2015a) 
After the Suruç bombing on 20 July 2015, for the first time, Turkey launched airstrikes 
towards IS bases located in Syria. However, Turkey had already joined the US-led 
coalition in September 2014 as one of the first members, and was also targeted by 
several terrorist attacks carried out by IS before the Suruç bombing. (Kanat/Ustun 
2015: 90) Therefore, the thesis at hand seeks to explore why Turkey took an active 
role in the anti-IS coalition only much later. Is this strategical shift in fighting IS 
caused by domestic factors or by pressure from the international system? On the one 
hand, one can observe a process of transformation on the domestic level and many 
events in the domestic area seem to have a direct effect on the decision-making 
process in foreign policy. On the other hand, it seems that Turkey is under massive 
pressure from international actors such as the USA, NATO and EU. (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 
2014: 24) 
The main purpose of this work is to analyse to which extent either domestic politics or 
external factors influencing the decision-making process. Turkey’s strategical approach 
in response towards IS under the AKP constitutes a fruitful case study in examining the 
driving forces in the decision-making process of Turkish foreign policy. Since the terror 
attacks in Paris, Ankara and Brussels, IS has become once more a centre of the 
current research debate in many countries. Turkey − as a common neighbour with both 
Syria and Iraq, the heartland of the militant organization, and at the same time ally of 
the Western world − plays a significant role, which is why the analysis of its strategy in 
combating IS is of vital importance.  
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3.2 Operationalization  
In social sciences terms and concepts are marked by a high degree of abstraction. In 
the light of the research question, this chapter seeks to overcome this problem and will 
operationalize the concepts applied in the thesis at hand. For this purpose, this chapter 
will clearly define the following concepts: domestic politics, foreign policy, international 
system and Islamic State. 
Domestic Politics 
The term politics has to be differentiated clearly from the two other dimensions of the 
political, applying to polity (political community) and policy (content/regulations). 
Accordingly, politics describes political processes on the nation-state level, for instance 
elections, voting or lobbying. This includes procedures within the decision-making 
process such as political disputes, debates or acts of war. In short, politics refers to 
power struggles between domestic actors inside of a state. (Vowe 2008: 620) In the 
Encyclopedia of Political Communication, the scholar Gerhard Vowe defines politics as 
the ‘(…) core of the political system’. (ibid.: 620) Methodically, doing research on 
domestic politics means to decompose the state into single fragments, known as 
opening the black box for detailed examinations. With regard to Turkey as the object 
of investigation, it is important to point out that the analysis of domestic politics is not 
limited to pure democracies. In any type of regime domestic political processes take 
place, although they are less transparent then in democracies. (Rathbun 2011: 691-
692)  
Foreign Policy 
The terminus foreign policy emerged within the process of increasing bureaucratization 
and systematization of state affairs during the industrial age. On the very basic level, 
foreign policy can be characterized as the total amount of relations in the international 
system by an independent actor, mostly the state. (Hill 2014: 320-321) In the classical 
sense, foreign policy is subjected to the governmental authority which consist of the 
foreign minister, president, defence minister, foreign trade-minister et al. As a result of 
the evolvement of multi-, supra- and international organizations, the terminus foreign 
policy also includes a state’s participation in or its relation to these organizations. 
(Seidelmann 1994: 42) Yet, the concept of foreign policy must be understood in a 
holistic way since it includes any actions and attitudes referring to outside of the state. 
(Hill 2014: 320-321) These external relations defined as foreign policy consist of 
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variety of actions, for instance, diplomatic negotiations, conclusion of contracts and 
state visits. In the broader meaning, it also includes foreign trade policies or cultural 
policies. (Seidelmann 1994: 42) 
International System 
The International Encyclopaedia of Political Science describes the terminus 
international system as follows: ‘The international system is made up of individual, 
constituent units and an ordering principle that arranges the structure of those units, 
together forming a whole toward an outside environment.’ (Engelbrekt 2011: 1322) 
Thus, the international system consists of three basic elements: the units, the overall 
structure and the interaction that takes place between the units and the overall 
structure. (ibid.: 1323) It is above all the nature of the structure in IR theory that is 
subject of interest and that every school approaches differently. In this regard, the 
absence of a supranational authority in terms of a state’s foreign policy formulation is 
widely discussed.  
One crucial characteristic of the international system is the territorial dimension. 
Traditionally, the relations between the states are based on mutual recognition of 
sovereignty. In the international system, states (units) communicate by using a variety 
of political instruments such as military power, diplomacy, economic resources or 
propaganda. However, demographic shifts and transnational cooperation undermine 
both national identities and the legal capacity of nation states. In this context, it is 
important to point out that the international system has always undergone a process of 
transformation; since the early 21st century it is mainly challenged by increasing 
technologisation, globalization, violence by non-state actors and transnational 
movements. Besides this, the establishment of international organizations shape the 
environment of the modern international system, which is why scholars discuss the 
future order of the international system. (Rosow 2005: 455-457) 
Islamic State 
The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), since 2014 officially calling itself IS, previously 
known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or Islamic State of Iraq and 
Sham (ISIS), is a militant movement that took over territory mainly in Syria, Iraq and 
Libya. (Bunzel 2015: 3) IS is classified or banned as a terrorist organization by most 
members of the international community including the UN, EU, USA and many non-EU 
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countries such as Turkey, Russia or India. The number of terror attacks carried out by 
IS outside of their heartland has increased significantly since 2014. (Laub 2016) 
The militant group, having emerged in the aftermath of the USA Iraq invasion in 2003, 
used to be part of al Qaeda Iraq back then and eventually expanded territorially after 
the uprisings in Syria had erupted in 2011. Currently, around 6,5 million people live 
under the domination of IS whose aim is to establish a territorial state. In June 2014, 
the group declared the establishment of the Caliphate, hence, it claims authority of the 
entire Muslim population with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the position of the Caliph. In 
media and many academic works, the Syrian city of Raqqa is named as the de facto 
capital of IS where most administrative institutions are located. (ibid.) Although IS and 
al Qaeda have already separated from each other, IS still clearly needs to be 
distinguished from al Qaeda: While IS seeks to establish a Sunni Islamist state under 
the religious law of the Sharia in the regions of Syria and Iraq, al Qaeda focuses on 
attacking the USA and its allies without any territorial aspirations. (Cronin 2015) 
3.3 The Applied Method: Process Tracing 
3.3.1 The Main Ideas of Process Tracing  
‘I want only to show what actually happened.’ – This is one of the most famous 
sentences in historical scholarship stated by Leopold von Ranke. (Himmelfarb 2004: 
17) Indeed, many scholars describe PT as a method that closely resembles the 
historical approach of research. To some extent the idea of PT follows Ranke’s 
approach in focusing on archival research in order to reconstruct historical events and 
detect how it actually happened.  
Generally speaking, PT is a single case research method that seeks for within-case 
inferences in order to detect causal mechanisms, that is to say, finding correlations 
between the independent variables (X) and the outcomes (Y). Shortly, ‘(…) the cause-
effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided 
into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.’ 
(Van Evera 1997: 64) The focus is on examining causal mechanisms by working on an 
in-depth level within the case, particular in order to determine ‘(…) how causal forces 
are transmitted through a series of interlocking parts of a causal mechanism to 
produce an outcome.’ (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 11) The core advantage of this method 
is that PT pays attention to dependent, independent and intervening variables, which is 
why a careful description and fine-grained case knowledge is required. (Collier 2011: 
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823) Metaphorically, while seeking the causal explanation for the outcome in question, 
the researcher opens the black box between the independent and dependent variable. 
(Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 133) 
The methodological approach of PT unpacks historical events over time and seeks to 
analyse the specific process that has led to a certain event. ‘Yet, grasping this 
unfolding is impossible if one cannot adequately describe an event or situation at one 
point in time.’ (Collier 2011: 824) The challenge here is to define the right time 
sequence while analysing the matter in question. (ibid.: 824) 
Many scholars compare the method of PT with the procedure of a criminal trial: the 
detective attempts to solve the crime retrospectively by collecting and evaluating clues 
and suspects. Eventually, he presents a convincing evidence-based explanation for the 
crime after testing all motives that the suspect factually committed the crime. (Bennett 
2010: 208)  
Similar to criminal trials, in qualitative research, the researcher builds its assumptions 
on observations, in PT called causal-process observations (CPO). The scholars 
Seawright and Collier describe CPO as ‘(…) an insight or piece of data that provides 
information about context, process, or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive 
leverage in causal inference.’ (Seawright/Collier 2004: 283) Continuing with the 
analogy of the criminal trial, one may compare the suspects with the hypotheses and 
following this logic, clues then resemble the COPs. (Collier 2011: 826) 
PT is subdivided into three different approaches: theory-testing, theory-generating and 
explaining outcome. While the first two approaches focus on theory (theory-centric), 
the latter emphasises on the individuality of the case (case-centric). Since this thesis 
seeks to explore the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy strategy towards IS, the explaining 
outcome approach will be applied. In contrast to theory-centric approaches, the goal is 
not testing or building a theory, but instead explaining a specific historical outcome in 
a particular case. (Klamberg 2015: 34) As an illustration, instead of studying general 
mechanism that lead to war, the aim would be to explain a particular example such as 
the cause for the First World War. The scholars Beach and Pederson conclude the main 
idea of explaining-outcome PT as follows: 
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Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, 
with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all the important aspects of 
an outcome with no redundant parts being present. (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 18) 
In contrast to theory-centric approaches of PT, where inferences are based on the 
presence or absence of causal mechanism, the case-centric approach evaluates 
postulated mechanisms in crafting minimally sufficient explanation factors. In practice, 
while studying the case, postulated hypotheses are tested until a sufficient explanation 
of the matter in question is found. (ibid.: 18-22) In order to evaluate these 
hypotheses, PT offers four types of tests differing in their rating scales. These are hoop 
tests, smoking-gun tests, straw in the wind tests and doubly decisive tests that will be 
explained in the next section of this chapter (3.3.2). 
What Gerrring calls the hallmark of process tracing (Gerring 2007: 173) is the fact that 
‘(…) some types of evidence have far more probative value than others. (…) What 
matters is the relationship between the evidence and the hypothesis, not the number 
of pieces of evidence.’ (Bennett 2010: 219) In other words, ‘(…) the probative value of 
evidence depends on the degree to which a hypothesis uniquely predicts that evidence, 
and the degree to which it is certain in doing so.’ (Van Evera 1997: 31)  
All in all, the purpose of applying this method is to detect causal mechanisms in the 
shift of Turkey’s foreign policy strategy towards IS. On this occasion, six different 
hypotheses derived from the two competing theories realism and liberalism will be 
tested in order to detect which of them has most explanatory power.  
3.3.2 The Four Variants of Tests in Process Tracing 
In order to detect causal inferences within the case, process tracing provides four test 
variants with different rating systems. These are 1) straw in the wind tests, 2) hoop 
tests, 3) smoking-gun tests and 4) doubly decisive tests. These four empirical tests 
became most popular due to Bennett’s publications who based his research on Van 
Evera’s work. (Van Evera 1997: 31-33) Each test differs in its information value and 
determines if a hypothesis is sufficient, which confirms the interference, or necessary, 
which only affirms the hypothesis. A hypothesis must be both sufficient and necessary 
in order to explain the outcome in question in a final manner. 
Firstly, the straw in the wind tests provide neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
criterion, thus, the test only points in a direction whether the hypothesis has 
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explanatory power or not. Consequently, they are not decisive and neither confirm nor 
eliminate a hypothesis. (Mahoney 2012: 572) Passing the test affirms the relevance of 
the piece of evidence, but does not confirm it. If a hypothesis fails this test, alternative 
hypotheses are marginally supported, whereas passing the test weakens rival 
hypotheses slightly. In comparison to the other test variants, the straw in the wind 
tests are the weakest and of least significance. (Collier 2011: 826) These tests serve 
as a basis for the hoop tests as well as for the smoking gun tests. ‘Alternatively, it 
might simply be viewed as an intermediate test, with corresponding implications for 
rival hypotheses.’ (ibid.: 825)  
As a second approach of testing hypotheses, the hoop tests provide necessary but no 
sufficient criteria for accepting the interference. In this sense, ‘[t]he hypothesis must 
jump through the hoop to remain under consideration (…).’ (ibid.: 825) In fact, the 
hoop tests evaluate if a given piece of evidence is present for the validity of the 
hypothesis. Passing the test only affirms the relevance of the hypothesis, but failing 
the hoop test eliminates the hypothesis, which can be seen as the greatest advantage 
of this sort of tests. (Mahoney 2012: 571) As an illustration, Van Evera provides the 
following example: ‘Was the accused in the state on the day of the murder?’ If he was 
absent he is innocent, however, the fact that he was in town also cannot prove that he 
is the murderer. (Van Evera 1997: 31) In comparison to straw in the wind tests, these 
hoop tests support or weaken rival hypotheses as well, but with stronger implications. 
Although it underpins the plausibility of the hypothesis in a more decisive way, the 
possibility that rivalling hypotheses may be relevant in explaining the outcome 
remains. (Collier 2011: 826) 
In the third place, PT offers the smoking gun tests, which only examine if the 
hypothesis is sufficient for the validity of the outcome in question. Yet, the test does 
not provide any information about the hypothesis’s necessity. (Bennett 2010: 210) The 
name smoking-gun goes back to the idea of observing a suspect with a smoking gun in 
its hand right after a crime, which immediately suggests the accusation that this 
person is guilty of the crime. The important point is that an alternative suspect, not 
been seen with a smoking gun in his hand, can also be guilty of the crime. (Van Evera 
1997: 64) The scholar Van Evera concludes that ‘[a]n explanation passing a smoking-
gun test of this sort is strongly corroborated, but little doubt is cast on an explanation 
that fails it.’ (ibid.: 32) In other words, passing the smoking-gun test confirms the 
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hypothesis and substantially weakens alternative hypotheses; likewise, failing the test 
does not eliminate the given hypothesis in a final manner but strengthens rival 
hypotheses. (Collier 2011: 827) ‘Passing a smoking gun test lends decisive support in 
favour of a hypothesis, though failing a smoking gun test does not eliminate a 
hypothesis.’ (Mahoney 2012: 572) 
Finally, the double decisive tests provide necessary and sufficient criteria for detecting 
a causal mechanism. In short, passing the double decisive tests confirm the hypothesis 
and eliminate all other rival hypotheses. ‘Just one doubly decisive piece of evidence 
may suffice, whereas many straw in the wind tests may still be indeterminate vis-à-vis 
alternative explanations.’ (Bennett 2010: 211) While explaining the double decisive 
tests, Van Evera provides the example of a bank camera that recorded the suspected 
bank robber. This piece of evidence − the bank’s film − is decisive in two ways since it 
can clearly prove if the suspect is guilty or innocent. (Van Evera 1997: 32) As Collier 
notes, such single tests that are able to evaluate both the necessary and sufficient 
criteria for establishing the causal interference are rare in social science. However, the 
same result can be achieved in combining multiple tests: Passing both the hoop tests 
and the smoking gun tests achieve the same result as the double decisive tests. 
(Collier 2011: 827) 
Overall, the question which test will be chosen for each hypothesis remains. Basically, 
the decision which test is most suitable for each single hypothesis is up to the 
researcher. Knowledge about the case, causal process observations and the quality of 
hypotheses are crucial in deciding which test is most appropriate. The stronger the 
assumption, the clearer the decision will be which test suits to the given piece of 
evidence. (ibid.: 826)  
3.3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Process Tracing  
The scholar Frank Schimmelfennig criticizes two main aspects. Firstly, he argues that 
PT might lead to an infinite regress, which means that either the researcher includes 
too many intermediate steps or that the level of analysis becomes lower. Furthermore, 
Schimmelfennig is concerned that in some cases PT may lead to what he calls 
storytelling: Due to a high amount of possible explanatory variables that are detected 
during the process analysis, it is usually feasible to create a sufficient causal 
mechanism in order to explain the outcome. As one consequence, the researcher may 
neglect alternative variables that could have affected the outcome as well. 
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(Schimmelfennig 2006: 267) Bennett agrees to his colleague and argues that ‘[t]here 
is no guarantee that researchers will include in their analyses the variable(s) that 
actually caused Y (…).’ (Bennett 2010: 209) Besides the risk of neglecting determining 
variables, a ‘(…) measurement error can be an issue, and probabilistic relationships are 
harder to address than in quantitative research.’ (Collier 2011: 828) Moreover, many 
scholars criticize the degree of freedom while studying the individual case. From a 
statistics’ point of view, the number of cases should be larger than the number of 
variables and not vice versa as it is the case in process tracing. (Bennett 2010: 209) 
In contrast, PT offers clear advantages over other methodological approaches in social 
sciences. First of all, in response to the often-criticised degree of freedom, one can 
argue that not the number of evidence or/and cases but rather the relationship 
between the evidence and the hypothesis is most decisive. Not every piece of evidence 
has the same explanatory power and differs in its value for the outcome in question. 
(Bennett 2010: 219) Moreover, explaining outcome PT does not raise the claim of 
generalization; on the contrary, the focus is on the single case that is the object under 
investigation. The understanding of causal mechanism is not only based on a 
systematic approach: This method allows an individual, case-specific examination. 
(Beach/Pedersen 2013: 18-22) The complexity and the variety of context-specific 
variables of each case ‘(…) makes the ambition of producing knowledge that can be 
generalized across many cases difficult, if not impossible.’ (ibid.: 13) Accordingly, 
case-centric scholars refuse any differentiation between theory-centric (systematic) 
and case-centric research; according to them, the complexity of the social world makes 
a generalization impossible anyhow. (ibid.: 13) Another strength of PT is that it can be 
mixed − depending on the outcome in question − with other methodological approaches 
in the sense of multi-method research that may include for instance studying primary 
and secondary sources (literature review) or interviewing. Collier stresses the fact that 
‘(…) the boundary between qualitative and quantitative should not be rigid.’ (Collier 
2011: 825) 
4. Contextualisation – Domestic Politics and Turkey’s 
Approach to Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
With regard to the applied methodological approach of process tracing, providing a 
historical background as well as presenting a fine-grained knowledge of the case is of 
vital importance in order to detect causal inferences. In the light of this paper’s case 
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study, the main contextual factors of both foreign policy and domestic politics will be 
explored.  
By referring to realism, the first part of this chapter will present the main guidelines of 
Turkish foreign policy, also called the Davutoğlu Doctrine. Special attention will be paid 
to the effects of the Syrian civil war on Turkish foreign policy and the AKP’s approach 
in countering IS and the PKK simultaneously.  
In accordance with the liberal approach which consists in first considering inter-state 
conditions in order to analyse a state’s foreign policy, the second part of this chapter 
offers background knowledge on Turkish domestic politics. The current situation of 
media and civil society as the main channels for domestic demands will be analysed. 
Afterwards, domestic constraints that the government might face in their policy-
making will be explored. An analysis of the political scope in which domestic actors can 
shape the governmental decision-making process will also provide insight into AKP’s 
understanding of liberal democracy. 
4.1 The Guidelines of Turkish Foreign Policy 
4.1.1 The Davutoğlu Doctrine and the Syrian Civil War as its Litmus 
Test 
The current Turkish foreign policy is strongly linked to the strategical approach 
introduced by Ahmed Davutoğlu. Since the AKP came to power, he has been the chief 
advisor for foreign policy and shaped Turkish foreign policy significantly. During his 
term in office as foreign minister (2009-2014) and premier minister (2014-2016), his 
influence on foreign policy was even greater. (Falk 2014) In his academic career, 
Davutoğlu introduced his foreign policy doctrine in several writings and became most 
famous with his book Strategic Depth, published in 2001.12  
His foreign policy doctrine Strategic Depth − known as zero problems with neighbours − 
outlines a specific position that Turkey should gain in the international system. More 
precisely, it serves as a justification of an active multi-dimensional and multi-regional 
Turkish foreign policy based on its geographical position as well as the historical and 
religious-cultural heritage from the Ottoman Empire. In this concept, Turkey is 
geographically seen as a state in the centre of a huge Eurasian-African landmass. 
                                           
 
12 For more information (only available in Turkish): Davutoğlu, Ahmed (2001), Stratejik Derinlik, Istanbul. 
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(Kramer 2010: 1-2) ‘In terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, 
Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea 
country.’ (Davutoğlu 2008: 79) Turkey shall strive for becoming a regional leader in 
the Middle East and playing a global strategic role by ‘(…) providing security and 
stability not only for itself, but also for its neighbouring regions. Turkey should 
guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to 
provide order, stability and security in its environs.’ (ibid.: 79) In accordance with 
Davutoğlu’s doctrine zero problems with neighbours, Turkey needs to overcome its 
sectarian politics and establish cordial relations with all its neighbours. (Walker 2011: 
7) As only one result of this foreign policy strategy, Turkey’s popularity in the Middle 
East increased immensely. Due to its successful approach of combining economic 
elements, democracy and a focus on Islamic tradition, Turkey became a role model for 
many other Muslim states in the region. (Ayata 2015: 96)  
After a decade of thriving policy-making in the Middle East, the onset of the Arab 
Spring challenged Turkish foreign policy significantly.13 (Öniş 2012: 59) In particular 
the Syrian civil war can be regarded as the litmus test for Turkey: Although the 
relation with Syria had always been difficult, under the rule of the AKP, Turkey rebuilt 
close ties with Syria including free trade agreements, lifted visa regimentals as well as 
cooperation in many other fields such as education or health care. In fact, Syria 
constituted the leading example in Turkey’s application of its zero problems with 
neighbours doctrine. (ibid.: 51-52) Then-PM Erdoğan’s emotional reaction to the Syrian 
crisis should be understand against this background: ‘We do not see Syria as a foreign 
problem, Syria is our domestic problem (…), we have historical and cultural ties, we 
have kinship.’ (AK Parti 2011) In response to the Syrian crisis, the Turkish government 
internationally lobbied for a military intervention in order to overthrow the Assad-
regime, albeit with little success. ‘Yet, as Syria’s uprising evolved into a civil war, 
Turkey’s reactions became increasingly erratic, confrontational, and interventionist.’ 
(Ayata 2015: 97) Turkey started to support oppositional forces, in particular the Free 
                                           
 
13 The Arab Spring in general affected Turkish foreign policy significantly. Due to its limited scope, this thesis will not discuss in detail to which 
extent and for which reason Turkish foreign policy has changed. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, a variety of literature has been published 
analysing the shift in Turkish foreign policy. For more information: Öniş, Ziya (2012), Turkey and the Arab Spring. Between Ethics and Self-
Interest, in: Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 45-63; Kuru, Ahmet T. (2015), Turkey’s Failed Policy towards the Arab Spring. Three Levels of 
Analysis, in: Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 94-117. 
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Syrian Army (FSA), which represents a turning point in Turkey’s foreign policy 
strategy. (Kuru 2015: 103)  
Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has been faced by several spill-overs 
in its border region. These include a massive influx of Syrian refugees, the flow of 
foreign fighters who seek to fight alongside jihadists groups, terrorist attacks by IS and 
increasing smuggle of oil, arms and other goods. (Coşkun 2016) Apart from that, 
Turkey’s border region is occasionally hit by airstrikes deriving from Syria. These 
border issues constitute not only a security threat to Turkey but also a financial 
challenge for the current government. (Al-Shahery/Frederick/Stebbins et. al. 2014: 
15) 
The long-lasting relationship with the USA, one of Turkey’s most important partners in 
security issues, once again deteriorated with the emergence of IS. Since the 
introduction of the anti-IS coalition in September 2014, the USA has put pressure on 
Turkey to become more active in the fight against IS. Turkey’s open door policy has 
posed the greatest struggle to the Obama-administration: besides Syrian refugees who 
flee from the civil war to Turkey, also foreign fighters pass the Turkish-Syrian border in 
a significant number. (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 24) While discussing Turkey’s role in 
the anti-IS coalition, ‘Turkish leaders also manifest concern that U.S. expectations of 
Turkish cooperation regarding Syria and Iraq are insufficiently sensitive to Turkey’s 
domestic pressures and security vulnerabilities.’ (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 9)  
All in all, Turkey lost its status as a regional mediator as well as many strategic 
relationships within the international community. (Coşkun 2016) ‘Thus, despite its 
efforts to establish itself in 2010 as a promoter of democracy in the region, in 2014 
Turkey appears as a partisan actor deeply embroiled in the power conflicts in Syria, 
and in repeated conflicts with the US, EU Russia, Iran, Saudi-Arabia, and Israel.’ 
(Ayata 2014: 105) Ironically, some scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy moved 
from zero problems with neighbours to zero neighbours without problems. 
(Halistoprak/Özdamar/Sula 2014: 106)  
After the resignation of Davutoğlu in May 2016, some scholars anticipated changes in 
Turkish foreign policy because the former prime minister had sought to maintain 
relationships to international partners. The scholar John Hudson stated in his article 
America Loses Its Man in Ankara that his resignation ‘(…) risks upending the currently 
fraught but still functioning relationship between Washington and Ankara — two wary 
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allies that nonetheless need each other in their shared fight against the Islamic State.’ 
(Hudson 2016) In May 2016, Binali Yildirim, known as a paladin of the President 
Erdoğan, was elected prime minister. In one of his first speeches, Yildirim summarized 
that the main aim of Turkish foreign policy was ‘(…) to continue pursuing policies which 
would ensure lasting peace and fellowship in the immediate region.’ (AK Parti 2016b) 
Judging from the party programme introduced only shortly after Yildirim´s accession to 
office, the main guidelines of Turkish foreign policy − introduced by Davutoğlu − were 
only slightly modified. (AK Parti 2016a) Nevertheless, it remains open to which extent 
Turkish foreign policy towards IS may change.  
4.1.2 Turkey’s Counterterrorism Strategies – Fight on Terror on Two Fronts 
Not only the PKK and IS target the Turkish state, but the government also faces terror 
attacks from leftist groups such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front 
(DHKP/C) and the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C). 
(Zeldin 2015: 2-3) Besides this, the AKP-government combats the so-called parallel 
structures by referring to the religious movement of the U.S.-based Islamic cleric 
Fethullah Gülen14, whose organization was recently designated as a terrorist group by 
the AKP-government. (Butler 2016)  
Since the focus of this thesis is to explain Turkey’s foreign policy shift towards IS, this 
chapter will focus on its counterstrategies towards IS and discuss the role of the PKK 
and its Syrian allies in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy. In response to the 
Suruç bombing, Turkey not only targeted IS in the end of July 2015, but also launched 
airstrikes against PKK-bases in Iraq. Scholars describe Turkey’s approach in countering 
both IS and the PKK simultaneously as a two-front fight. (Kanat/Ustun 2015: 90) The 
fact that Turkey in June 2015 had already started to carry out a large-scale anti-terror 
campaign focusing on both IS networks and suspected members of the PKK 
strengthens the scholars’ hypothesis. (Stein 2015) Presumably, the reason for this is 
Turkey’s approach to treat any terrorist organization in an equivalent way. ‘There is no 
difference between the PKK, Daesh, and FETO [Gülen-movement]. They all serve the 
                                           
 
14 Fethullah Gülen, born in 1941, is a Turkish cleric living in exile in the USA since the 1990s who initiated the Gülen community that rapidly be-
came a massive international religious movement. The then-PM Erdoğan used to be allied with Mr. Gülen and supported the movement until 
2011 when the friendship cooled down. Since then, an open rivalry between Gülen and Erdoğan has broken out. After the failed coup attempt, 
Erdoğan accused Gülen, and thousands of state officials have been suspended or arrested. Already in 2010, US-diplomats have argued that 
members of the Gülen-movement have infiltrated the Turkish State. ‘Even Turkey's opposition parties agree with Erdoğan's assessment of Gülen 
− a unity not often seen in Turkish politics.’ (Belli/Caylan/Popp 2016) 
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same purpose’, Erdoğan said in a meeting of Islamic NGOs at the presidential palace. 
(N.A. 2016b) 
From the mid-1980s onwards the Turkish government has been constantly combating 
the PKK that seeks to establish an independent Kurdish state in south-eastern Turkey 
and is therefore regarded as one of the main threats to the Turkish state. (Zeldin 
2015: 1) Terror attacks launched by the PKK and its separatist aspirations have 
increased the tensions and have led periodically to violent clashes between the Turkish 
state and the PKK. Yet, the PKK’s approach has shifted over time and ‘[t]he initially 
secessionist demands of the PKK have since ostensibly evolved towards the less 
ambitious goal of greater cultural and political autonomy.’ (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 14) 
Similar to the current debate on the conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK, 
Turkey’s approach in dealing with the PKK has often been criticized by Western 
governments and by human rights organizations for taking overly harsh measures 
against ethnic Kurds. (ibid.: 14) 
With the onset of the Syrian civil war renewed tensions between the PKK and Turkish 
authorities arose. It is to be assumed that this was related to Kurdish politics in 
northern Syria. The Syrian equivalent to the PKK − the Democratic Union Party (PYD) − 
gained political control over Kurdish-populated enclaves along the Turkish-Syrian 
border. The Turkish government raised concerns that the Syrian border region could 
become another base for PKK operations such as training and administration as it is 
the case in the northern part of Iraq, which is under the authority of the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG). (ibid.: 14) Since the PYD’s militia − the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) − has taken control over large territory along the border, 
tensions between Turkey and the PKK have increased. The fact that the PYD operates 
as an anti-IS ground force in cooperation with the USA has also deteriorated Turkey’s 
relation to its ally, the USA. (Salih 2015: 4) According to the scholars Kanat and Ustun, 
Turkey fears to lose control over its borderline with Syria. As one scenario, arms given 
to the PYD may fall into the hands of the PKK and be used against Turkey. 
(Kanat/Ustun 2015: 89) 
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The intricate relationship between the USA, Turkey and Kurdish forces has to be seen 
against the background of domestic politics. The cease-fire agreement15 between the 
Turkish state und the PKK − introduced in March 2013 − collapsed in the aftermath of 
the Suruç bombing when tensions heavily reinflamed. Only two days after that terrorist 
attack, the PKK claimed the death of two Turkish policemen to be an act of revenge for 
the Suruç bombing for which they accused the AKP-government. In response, Turkey 
launched airstrikes against PKK bases in Iraq and arrested hundreds of ethnic Kurds 
suspected as members of the PKK. (Salih 2015: 4) Terror attacks by the PKK on 
Turkish security personnel and Turkish airstrikes targeting PKK bases followed. (Totten 
2015: 7) The increasing tensions led to an escalating conflict between the Turkish 
military and the PKK in south-eastern Turkey. Only in the time period from July to 
September 2015, dozens of civilians and hundreds of Turkish soldiers as well as PKK-
fighters died. (European Commission 2015: 24-25)  
The other enemy in Turkey’s two-front fight − IS − started to target Turkey in the 
beginning of 2014 when three security personnel were shot by IS-fighters at a 
checkpoint close to Niğde. Terror attacks such as the Suruç bombing and spill-overs 
from the Syrian conflict threaten Turkey’s internal and external security, and therefore 
the Turkish government implemented various counterterrorism strategies. Turkey’s 
measures in countering IS focus mainly on three aspects: 1) preventing potential 
foreign fighters from entering Turkey, 2) hindering foreign fighters from travelling to 
Syria and 3) containing illicit smuggling in the border region, in particular oil, that 
constitutes one of the most important sources of income for terrorist organizations 
such as IS. (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 32) 
First of all, Turkey is constantly improving a no-entry list for suspected Islamist 
terrorists which the government had already introduced in 2011. (ibid.: 32) According 
to Turkish officials in July 2015, more than 15,000 suspected extremist foreign fighters 
were banned from entering Turkey. (N.A. 2015b) Since Turkey is co-chairing the 
Working Group on Foreign Terrorist Fighters (WGFTF) in the framework of the anti-IS 
                                           
 
15 Although the AKP-government and the PKK agreed on a cease-fire in 2013, violent clashes occurred sporadically in south-eastern Turkey. 
While Turkish security forces increased their presence in the region, the HDP and the PKK strengthened their influence on the local governments’ 
infrastructure. In the run-up to the elections in June 2015, a harsh political debate between the AKP and HDP culminated in massive accusations 
against each other. Tensions increased steadily, and as a consequence, the PKK declared the end of the cease-fire which eventually led to a wave 
of terror attacks, and an armed conflict in south-eastern Turkey arose. (Park 2016: 464) For further information regarding the conflict between 
the Turkish state and the PKK: Özcan, Ali N. / Yavuz, Hakan M. (2015), Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question, in: Middle East Policy, Vol. 
22, No. 4, pp. 73-87. 
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coalition, the government particularly works on strategies that shall contain the flow of 
foreign fighters. One measure involves the promotion of greater intelligence sharing 
between the member states of the coalition, and for this reason, Ankara hosted the 
first meeting in November 2015 regarding this issue. (Rep. of Turkey-Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2016)  
In a second step, Turkey installed risk analysis units which shall detect suspected 
foreign travellers at airports, border cities and border crossings who seek to join 
extremist organisations in Syria. In 2014, Turkey had not yet introduced an advanced 
system for recording passengers’ information which is why this step marks an 
important progress in decreasing the number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria. 
(Zeldin 2015: 5) Already in July 2015, the presidential spokesmen Ibrahim Kalin 
defended Turkey’s strategy in combating IS by stating: ‘Turkey listed Daesh as a 
terrorist organization in October 2013 and since then has deported around 1,600 
foreign nationals who have been found to have ties with it’. (N.A. 2015b) 
As a third measure, according to the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, Turkey 
improved its security standards at the Turkish-Syrian border. This includes an official 
closure of all border gates in early 2015. Additionally, Turkey improved its border 
security by enhancing special forces that patrol constantly along the border. (Rep. of 
Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016) Apart from that, Turkey announced that a wall 
of a length of 900 km along the borderline will be finished in February 2017 in order to 
stop illegal border crossings and smuggling. (Butler/Coskun 2016) 
Lastly, concerning cross-border smugglings, notably oil, the Turkish foreign ministry 
points out that Turkey ‘(…) employs effective and robust measures to prevent 
smuggling activities [and] conducts a zero-tolerance policy regarding illegal cross-
border activities.’ (Rep. of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016) Turkish authorities 
stated that 300 kilometres of illicit pipelines were destroyed and suspected oil stores 
were closed. In April 2013, Turkey tightened the legislation regarding the smuggling of 
oil and the sale of smuggled oil in gas stations. Moreover, in line with the UN Security 
Council resolution 219916, Turkey regularly shares information about the amount of 
smuggled oil with the UN-led Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. (ibid.) In terms of terror 
                                           
 
16 For further information: S/RES/2199 (2015), online: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF CF9B-6D27- 4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2199.pdf, 14.10.2016. 
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financing, Turkey ‘(…) has launched a comprehensive strategy and took effective 
measures to combat Daesh’s finances and disrupt and prevent the terrorist 
organizations from raising, moving and using funds.’ (ibid.) Yet, the Turkish 
government does not provide any information how these measures look like.  
4.2 Domestic Politics under the AKP-government  
4.2.1 Media and Civil Society as the Mouthpiece of Turkish Society 
On a press conference in January 2016, US-President Barack Obama expressed 
concerns about the situation of freedom of press in Turkey: ‘And there is no doubt that 
President Erdoğan has repeatedly been elected through a democratic process, but I 
think the approach that they've been taking towards the press is one that could lead 
Turkey down a path that would be very troubling.’ (The White House 2016) 
In every democratic system, media play a crucial role in informing the people as well 
as serving as a platform for public discussion. Therefore, this chapter aims at analysing 
to which extent media and civil society are able to shape the governmental decision-
making process. In the 65th government programme, the AKP clearly defines the role 
of media in a democratic system. 
Free, independent, multi-voiced written press and visual media is one of the most 
important assurances of the democratic regime. It is fundamental to preserve the 
freedom to receive correct information and news. All measures shall be taken to 
ensure such an environment. (AK Parti 2016a) 
According to Reporters Without Borders in 2016, Turkey reached the 151st rank out of 
180 countries in the world press freedom index, one place below the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and one place ahead of Tajikistan. (Reporters Without Borders 
2016a) In comparison, three years after the AKP came to power, in 2005, Turkey 
achieved the 98th place out of 160 countries. Accordingly, in the period from 2005 to 
2016, the degree of press freedom declined significantly. (Reporters Without Borders 
2016b) The organization Freedom House notices a similar result: Turkey’s degree of 
press freedom shifted from partly free in 2005 to not free in 2016. (Freedom House 
2016)  
Under the rule of the AKP, the freedom of press has been increasingly restricted. 
Against this background, Reporters Without Borders point out that ‘President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan has embarked on an offensive against Turkey’s media. Journalists are 
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harassed, many have been accused of insulting the president and the internet is 
systematically censored.’ (Reporters Without Borders 2016b) The European 
Commission (EC) adds that the ‘(…) ongoing and new criminal cases against 
journalists, writers or social media users are of serious concern.’ (European 
Commission 2015: 22) 
In general terms, the Turkish media market is highly concentrated which fosters the 
process of an enforced conformity. ‘A small number of wealthy holding companies own 
nearly all of the country’s most important outlets in both television and print.’ 
(Corke/Finkel/Kramer et. al. 2014: 5) As only one consequence, in case of high 
political pressure, many newspapers ran with similar headlines. For instance, during 
the Gezi protests, seven newspapers printed the same quote from the then-PM 
Erdoğan on the front cover: ‘I would give my life for the demands of democracy’. 
(ibid.: 13) 
Since tensions between the Turkish state and the PKK reinflamed in summer 2015, 
also political pressure on media has increased. According to Freedom House, 
throughout 2015, ‘(…) at least 348 journalists, columnists, and media workers were 
dismissed or forced to quit during the year.’ (Freedom House 2016) Already during the 
Gezi protests, around 59 journalists who had reported critically on the government lost 
their jobs. (Corke/Finkel/Kramer et. al. 2014: 5) Freedom House concludes that the 
fear of prosecution or the loss of employment has led to a widespread self-censorship. 
(Freedom House 2016) 
Above all, the high number of prosecutions of journalists in the framework of the 
criminal code is criticized. Especially the law on fight against terrorism (no. 3713)17 has 
been widely discussed due to its broad formulation that leaves room for interpretation. 
The scholars Pierini and Mayr argue that ‘(…) the imprisonment of journalists has a 
distinct Kurdish dimension and is largely based on the anti-terrorism legislation.’ 
(Pierini/Mayr 2013: 5) In the context of the Turkish penal code, most journalists face 
trials on the basis of insulting the president (art. 299) and denigrating the Turkish 
                                           
 
17 For further information on the law on fight against terrorism. Law on Fight Against Terrorism No. 3713, online: 
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1335519341_turkey-anti-terr-1991-am2010-en.pdf, 05.07.2016. 
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nation (art. 301)18. Besides this, many journalists are accused of being a member in a 
criminal organization due to article 314 of the Turkish penal code19. (Office of the 
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 2015) As reported by Zeldin, ‘(…) the 
legislation’s broad reach has enabled Turkish authorities to use it to detain and 
prosecute thousands of politicians, reporters, and activists.’ (Zeldin 2015: 4) 
Additionally, the internet law (no. 5651) and in particular its implementation became 
the subject of criticism as the censorship of internet content increased steadily. 
(Akgül/Kırlıdoğ 2015: 2) The EC raises concern that the internet law strengthens ‘(…) 
the government’s powers to block content without court order on an unduly wide range 
of grounds.’ (European Commission 2015: 22)  
Besides media, civil society organizations (CSO) constitute another important channel 
through which public opinion can shape a government’s decision-making process. In 
the new party programme of the 65th government, the AKP clearly highlights the 
importance of an active civil society for democracy. The participation by civil actors 
‘(…) indicates that a democratic regime is not a one-way regime, and that it is a two-
way interaction by those who govern and those who are governed.‘ (AK Parti 2016a) In 
this sense, the current government states that they want to improve civil-state 
relations in the way that ‘[o]pinions of the non-governmental organizations shall be 
obtained in order to modify the related legal arrangements and a legal framework shall 
be drawn up to raise the civil society organizations to the level at contemporary 
democratic countries. (ibid.)  
Although civil-state relations have been weak since the Ottoman Empire, CSOs 
emerged steadily in the 1980s. ‘Despite their deficiencies, which are deeply rooted in 
their ongoing weak status in the country’s social and political sphere, CSOs have begun 
to gain importance in Turkey’s societal and political affairs.’ (Içduygu 2011: 384-384) 
Within the scope of the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey, the EU 
already repeatedly underlined the importance of civil society as one of the crucial 
elements in the consolidation of democracy and thus as a precondition for a 
membership. Especially in the beginning of the accession negotiations, prominent 
                                           
 
18 In order to provide an example, on the basis of article 301 of the penal code, which punishes the denigration of the Turkish nation, many 
journalists have been accused because of discussing the division of Cyprus, criticizing Turkish security forces or claiming that an Armenian geno-
cide took place. (Freedom House 2016) 
19 For further information on the penal code: Council of Europe (2015), Penal Code of Turkey, COE online: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)011-e, 16.10.2016. 
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CSOs such as Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD) and Women 
Entrepreneurs Association (KAGIDER) lobbied for a membership in the EU domestically 
and internationally. (ibid.: 385) 
CSOs with a focus on economic issues, in particular business associations − such as 
Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) and the Turkish Exporters Assembly 
(TIM) − are most able to shape foreign policy decisions. This can be explained by the 
fact that the AKP’s guiding line is mainly based on economic success.20 The following 
example reflects to which extent business organizations may shape Turkish foreign 
policy: In April 2016, President Erdoğan visited many states in Africa accompanied by 
half of the Turkish cabinet and 150 businessmen from DEIK who closed several 
business deals in the fields of construction and education. (N.A. 2016a)  
The scope of influence of most non-governmental actors remains little. According to 
the annual progress report of the EC, most CSOs are not able to take part in the 
process of decision-making. ‘A number of CSOs have also continued to see their 
regular operations challenged through court closure cases, penalties, restrictions or 
discriminatory practices by public authorities. Restrictions on freedom of assembly 
remained a problem for segments of civil society (…).’ (European Commission 2015: 
10)  
To sum up, one can conclude that the Turkish government does not provide a sufficient 
legal framework in which civil society and media can operate on an independent basis. 
Apart from that, the current Turkish government controls large parts of the media 
landscape. Journalists as well as internet users face high pressure that leads to self-
censorship and a highly concentrated media sector. (Corke/Finkel/Kramer et. al. 2014: 
5) It is to be assumed that the scope of influence in the decisions-making process is 
restricted for the majority of civil society.   
4.2.2 The Legal Framework and Domestic Constraints  
The Turkish Constitution, written in 1982 by the military after the third coup, sets up 
the basis of a parliamentary democracy in which the cabinet depends on the 
confidence of the legislative. Due to the parliament’s controlling function over the 
                                           
 
20 The economical approach constitutes an important element of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, for further information: Kirişc, Kemal 
(2009), The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy. The Rise of the Trading State, in: New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, pp. 29-57. 
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executive − vote of confidence and vote of censure –the legislative is formally able to 
influence foreign policy issues. (Özbudun 2011: 66-67) Yet, single-party majorities and 
strong party discipline ‘(…) makes it highly unlikely for a Council of Ministers or an 
individual minister to be ousted by a vote of no-confidence.’ (ibid.: 67) 
Since the AKP came to power in 2002, the party has held the majority in the 
parliament with increasing election results up to 50 % in 2011. Only in June 2015 the 
AKP lost a significant share of the votes and no coalition with any other party could be 
formed which eventually led to a re-run of the elections in November of the same year. 
In these elections, the AKP regained its majority with 49,5 % and the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) remained being the strongest opposition party with 25,32 %, 
followed by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with 11,9 % and the Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (HDP) with 10,76 % share of the votes. (Çarkoğlu 2015: 1-2) Due to 
a 10 % threshold (Art. 33/1, Law No. 2839), the Turkish parliament shows only little 
fragmentation and thus currently consists of four parties including the single-ruling 
party AKP. (Erdem/Solak 2012: 18)  
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in June 2015, the AKP mainly promoted 
their political goal of transforming the Turkish system into a presidential democracy. 
(Çarkoğlu 2015: 4) Although the president legally needs to operate outside of the 
party, the current President Erdoğan represents the central person in the decision-
making process within the AKP’s party structure. (Seufert 2014: 4) ‘De facto, 
Erdoğan’s election as president has already transitioned Turkey to a presidential 
system, even if the constitution still provides for a parliamentary one. The new cabinet 
clearly bears Erdoğan’s hallmark.’ (ibid.: 5) The scholar Seufert concludes that the 
current President Erdoğan undermines the power and independency of the Turkish 
parliament. (ibid.: 4) 
The AKP’s supremacy in parliament and the president’s proximity to the AKP resulted 
in the establishment of a quasi-presidential system that significantly weakens 
opposition forces. (ibid.: 4) It is questionable to which extent the exchange of opinions 
is possible and in how far the parliamentarians, excluding members of the AKP, are 
able to shape the decision-making process in foreign policy. A pluralistic parliament is 
not just crucial in controlling the executive and adapting laws, but also because ‘[a]s in 
many parliament systems, parliamentary supervision and debates aim at influencing 
public opinion, rather than unseating the government.’ (Özbudun 2011: 68) It is 
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feasible to argue that members of the AKP are able to determine the discourse in the 
Turkish parliament and, in consequence, influence public opinion. On that premise, 
Gumuscu and Keyman are concerned about the consolidation of democracy in Turkey: 
‘The AKP’s attitude towards the opposition combined with the opposition’s 
ineffectiveness reinforce the AKP’s tendency to monopolize the task of democratization 
which results in ownership of the democratization process (…), thus produces 
somewhat paradoxical counter-democratic manifestations.’ (Gumuscu/Keyman 2014: 
57) 
It is important to point out that AKP’s electoral success is closely linked to its economic 
policies. Under the rule of the AKP, the country witnessed a sustained economic growth 
that contributed to the party’s political success. Turkey presented itself as a stable and 
reliable business partner, which contributed to a wave of foreign investments. (Karagöl 
2013: 115) In 2011, Turkey and China were regarded as the most rapidly growing 
economies in the world: Turkey’s world trade increased from $82 billion in 2000 to 
$389 billion in 2012. As only one consequence, the life standard of Turkey’s citizens 
improved sustainably. Due to Turkey’s economic success, a middle class with 
increasing prosperity emerged as it was the case in many Western countries 
throughout the 1950s. (Cagaptay 2014: 16) In this sense, the AKP needs to ensure 
Turkey´s current economic success in order to receive the sufficient majority in 
parliament in the upcoming elections. 
When the AKP came to power in 2002, the military was one of the most influential 
opposition forces in Turkey. For a long time in Turkish history, the military dominated 
Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy by playing the role of the guardian of the 
kemalist heritage with its primary aim to protect the secular order. (Ayata 2015: 107) 
Since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1950, the military carried out three 
coups and each time took power in the form of an interim government. (Alpay 2009: 
9) Until the 1970s, the military was the most operative institution and therefore was 
able to secure its political function on a legal basis by constitutional amendments. 
(Heper/Keyman 1998: 265) Besides this, ‘[t]he military’s power was sustained through 
heightened national security discourse that portrayed Turkey as surrounded by hostile 
neighbours and under constant threat from internal enemies, such as minorities, 
Islamists, or lefties.’ (Ayata 2015: 107) After a decade of power struggles between the 
military and the current government, the AKP eventually ousted the military from 
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power by applying democratic tools: In the context of the accession negotiations 
between Turkey and the EU and by the implementation of several democratization 
packages initiated by the EU, the military’s influential power decreased. (Söyler 2009: 
5-6) Yet, with the resurgence of the Kurdish conflict, an AKP-military coalition 
remerged. Many scholars such as Tol criticize that ‘Erdoğan has given the military a 
blank check to wage war against Kurdish insurgents and has struck a cosy alliance with 
the generals.’21 (Tol 2016) 
The AKP’s predominant position in Turkish politics contributed to a shift in social 
cleavages. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s society has been 
marked by a division along the conflict line of modernist fractions with its roots in the 
kemalist state elite and traditional-religious groups of society. However, many scholars 
argue that this cleavage does not apply to the current Turkish society anymore. A new 
type of political polarization emerged: ‘(…) the conceptual divergences that have 
become visible in recent years run along the lines of being either for or against the AKP 
government and its concept of democracy.’ (Göğüş/Mannitz 2016: 19)  
In summary, it has become evident that due to the AKP’s majority in parliament and 
the military’s loss of power constrains on the governmental level declined. Apart from 
that, the AKP and the Turkish President Erdoğan have introduced a quasi-presidential 
system that increasingly weakens political opponents.  
5. The Shift in Turkey’s Counterterrorism Strategy to-
wards Islamic State 
5.1 Facts and Figures on the Case 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Turkey 
hosts around 2.7 million Syrian refugees who have fled from the civil war as reported 
in September 2016. (UNCHR 2016) This high number of refugees can be explained by 
the fact that Turkey used to apply an open door policy at its borders with Syria and 
Iraq. At a meeting with members of the UN in September 2015 concerning the current 
refugee and migration movement, the then-PM Davutoğlu clearly defended the 
                                           
 
21 A group within the Turkish military carried out a coup attempt on 16 July 2016. Eventually, the coup plotters were defeated by pro-
government security forces. The government accused Fethullah Gülen and his supporters to be responsible for the coup attempt, thus, thousands 
of suspected Gülen followers in public service have been arrested or suspended, including soldiers, doctors, judges and academics. 
(Belli/Caylan/Popp 2016) In response to the failed coup attempt, the AKP government declared the state of emergency that was supposed to last 
three months. Officially, the government still fears a second coup attempt by parts of the military. (Rosenfeld 2016) 
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maintenance of Turkey’s border policy by stating: ‘Despite all challenges, we still 
continue our open door policy for Syrians fleeing from the violence in their country, 
without any discrimination with regard to religious or ethnic origin.’ (Davutoğlu 2015: 
1)  
This open border policy not only led to an immense arrival of refugees in Turkey, but 
scholars and most of Turkey’s allies also raised the concern that Tukey had been 
indirectly involved in supporting terrorism in the sense that foreign fighters have used 
the Turkish-Syrian border for transit and smuggling. (Zeldin 2015: 2) The scholars 
Schanzer and Tahiroglu argue in the same way: ‘It is unclear whether Ankara is 
explicitly assisting these groups, or whether JN [Al-Nusra Front] and IS are merely 
exploiting Turkey’s lax border policies.’ (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 3) However, it is 
fact that Turkey has supported irregular fighters in particular in the early stages of the 
uprisings, notably the FSA, in order to overthrow the Assad-regime in Syria. Unlike 
Turkey’s expectations, the Assad-regime was not toppled, and jihadist groups such as 
IS started to dominate the Syrian opposition forces. (ibid.: 3) The ongoing conflict in 
Syria and the rapid rise of extremist organisations led to an increasing stream of 
extremist fighters into Syria. This also contributed to the establishment of several IS-
linked sleeper cells within Turkey. (Sengupta 2016: 3-4) By insisting on the creation of 
a safe zone along the Turkish-Syrian border, Turkey had previously refused to allow 
military airstrikes of the anti-IS coalition from Turkish airbases. (Thomas/Zanotti 
2016: 29) ‘All of this has raised questions about Turkey’s value as an American ally, 
and its place in the NATO alliance.’ (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 3)  
In point of fact, already in 2014, Turkish soldiers have started to train Kurdish 
Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq as part of the fight against IS, as a senior Turkish 
official declared. ‘We have said many times we want a comprehensive strategy. It is 
impossible to stop these terrorists only by bombing (…) If you try to kill the 
mosquitoes it will not work, you have to dry the swamp’. (Pamuk 2014) Apart from 
that, in October 2014, the Turkish parliament assigned authority to the government to 
send military into Iraq or Syria in case the national security is threatened. This 
mandate also allowed foreign forces to operate in Turkey. (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 
21)  
The Suruç bombing on 20 July 2015 marks the turning point in Turkish foreign policy 
towards IS. In response to that terror attack, the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs 
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published a press release concerning the Turkey-US cooperation in fighting IS. In this 
press release, Turkey emphasises that it had already contributed to the anti-IS 
coalition in the past, but that it will further deepen its engagement in the fight against 
IS alongside the USA. As one part of the deeper cooperation with the USA, Turkey 
announced that it would expand its role in the coalition by carrying out military 
airstrikes. 
It is clear that these threats and attacks directed against our national security will 
receive the response they deserve. Eliminating the threat posed by DEASH both within 
our borders as well as to our security has been an important aspect of the joint 
operational work conducted between Turkey and the US for some time now. (Rep. of 
Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015a)  
However, the terrorist attack in Suruç was not the first time that IS has targeted 
Turkish civilians and security personnel. (see Appendix 1) Already in March 2014, three 
Turkish security personnel were killed at a regular checkpoint in the central Anatolian 
province of Niğde by members of IS. (Idiz 2014b) This incident was followed by an 
attack on a Turkish consulate in Iraq: Along with the conquest of the Iraqi town of 
Mosul in June 2014, IS seized the Turkish consulate and took 49 people as hostages. 
The attack on the consulate constitutes one of the most serious attacks in modern 
Turkish history. In order to free the hostages Turkey negotiated directly with IS and in 
return, according to multiple sources, released 180 IS-fighters. (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 
2014: 21) Shortly after the hostage-taking in Mosul, Erdoğan defended Turkey’s policy 
towards IS by arguing that the government had to be careful in taking action against 
IS because the hostages’ lives were in danger. In this context, he announced that 
Turkey would play a more active role in the coalition. (Idiz 2014a) Yet, Turkey did not 
intensify its actions against IS at that point. Only a few days before the parliamentary 
election in June 2015, IS again targeted Turkey: Four people were killed and more 
than 100 injured during a rally of HDP-supporters in Diyarbakır. (N.A. 2015k) Following 
the attack in Suruç in July 2015, one soldier was killed at a border outpost in Kilis to 
which Turkey responded by military operations targeting IS bases but without entering 
Syrian airspace. (N.A. 2015l)  
Although Turkey was threatened by IS much earlier than the Suruç bombing in July 
2015 and has been a member of the anti-IS coalition since September 2014, the AKP-
government had not countered the Islamist organization very actively until this point 
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which was highly criticized by its NATO-allies. ‘However, following the Suruç attack, 
Turkey revised its strategy, adopting a new doctrine to deal simultaneously with all 
designated terrorist organizations, most significantly ISIS and PKK.’ (Kanat/Ustun 
2015: 89) In response to the Suruç bombing, Turkey launched its first airstrikes 
against IS bases and allowed US-forces to use the air bases in Incirlik, Diyarbakır and 
Malatya in order to operate against IS. (ibid.: 88) Evidently, after the Suruç bombing 
on 20 July 2015, Turkey has shifted its foreign policy strategy towards IS.  
The following chapter seeks to detect the driving forces that led to Turkey’s turn in its 
foreign policy strategy. In order to clarify the overall question whether domestic 
politics or the international system caused this shift, three given hypotheses will be 
examined from both level of analysis – domestic and international –in accordance with 
the methodological approach of PT. 
5.2 The First Level of Analysis: The Impact of External Factors 
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1: The Increasing Security Threat at the Turkish-Syrian Border 
led to the Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy 
During the Cold War, the Turkish-Syrian border was factually an extension of the Iron 
Curtain. While Turkey served as NATO’s eastern flank state, Syria was allied with the 
Soviet Union. At any time, the relations with Syria have been difficult: ‘Turkey’s policy 
toward Syria in the past decade has been a rollercoaster ride.’ (Abramowitz/Edelman 
2013: 21) In the late 1990s, the Turkish-Syrian border became a scene of military 
operations. By moving heavy ordinances to the border region, Turkey forced Syria to 
expel PKK’s leader Abdulah Öcalan who lived in exile in Syria. Until the onset of the 
Syrian civil war, a period of warm relations with Syria followed. (ibid.: 22)  
Turkey has been significantly affected by the continuing civil war in Syria. An 
increasing arrival of refugees, the flow of foreign fighters and the extensive smuggling 
of oil, arms and other goods not only pose a security threat to Turkey, but also a 
financial challenge for the current government. (Al-Shahery/Frederick/Stebbins et. al. 
2014: 15) As only one consequence for the internal security, a high number of IS-
sleeper cells within Turkey is presumed. (Sengupta 2016: 3-4) According to a Turkish 
police report from September 2015, around 3000 people living in Turkey are suspected 
to be linked to IS. Apart from that, IS controls several spots at the Turkish-Syrian 
border, which the report evaluates as an increasing security risk for Turkey. 
(Kızılkoyun 2015) Only a few days before Turkey launched its first airstrikes against IS 
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on 29 July 2015, one Turkish soldier was killed by IS-fighters close to Kilis during 
cross-border clashes. (N.A. 2015l)  
Taking together these facts, the hypothesis at hand argues that Turkey was 
increasingly concerned about the security situation at its border with Syria which is 
why the Turkish government decided to step up its fight against IS. A statement by the 
Turkish ministry of foreign affairs of 24 July 2015 − one day after the soldier was killed 
in Kilis − underpins the hypothesis in question: ‘The DEASH problem is a primary 
national security threat for Turkey. The dimensions of this threat are constantly 
growing.’ (Rep. of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015a)  
Since the outbreak of the armed clashes in Syria, Turkey was occasionally hit by 
rockets and missiles in its border region, especially in the cities of Reyhanlı, Kilis and 
Suruç. ‘Authorities admit that keeping security watertight along the 915-kilometer-long 
border is difficult despite a massive military presence recently reinforced by additional 
troops.’ (Durmuş 2015) After each attack suspected to be carried out by IS or other 
terrorist groups, Turkey responded by military operations: ‘We have never left any 
attack on Turkish lands and citizens unanswered and we will never leave it 
unanswered’, said the Turkish President Erdoğan. (Girit 2016) 
Due to this high security threat, already in November 2012, Turkey demanded support 
from the NATO in order to secure its border to Syria. In February 2013, the NATO set 
up six missile batteries along the Turkish-Syrian border in the framework of the 
operation Active Fence.22 As only one side effect, the operation Active Fence has 
improved the relationship between Turkey and the NATO. This marks an important 
step since the organization constitutes one of the most important allies for Turkey in 
security issues. (NATO 2013) 
In addition, Turkey constantly called on both the USA and the NATO to create a no-fly 
zone in Syria along the Turkish border with the purpose of establishing a corridor in 
which refugees and Syrian opposition forces find a safe haven. Turkish authorities 
argued that the creation of a save zone would also decrease the flow of foreign 
terrorist fighters. Yet, both the USA and the NATO refused this demand. (Hadjicostis 
2016) The rejection not only led to tensions with the USA, but also Turkey’s foreign 
                                           
 
22 For more information: NATO (2013), NATO support to Turkey. Background and timeline, online: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_92555.htm? 12.10.2016. 
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policy approach towards Syria in general increasingly seemed about to fail. 
(Sazak/Kibaroglu 2015: 99)  
Although Turkey fully joined the anti-IS coalition in August 2015, the Turkish President 
Erdoğan called on Turkey’s allies to provide more assistance in order to protect the 
Turkish-Syrian border region: ‘They have left us alone in our struggle against this 
organisation which is shedding our blood both through suicide bombings and by 
attacks on Kilis.23 (…) In Syria none of those who say they are fighting Daesh have 
suffered the kind of losses that we have, nor paid such a heavy price as us.’ (N.A. 
2016c)  
As another piece of evidence, Turkey has intensified its border security since IS 
emerged. Besides other measures Turkey took in fighting IS (see chapter 4.1.2), in 
early 2015, the AKP-government most essential closed its border to Syria and 
introduced additional security personnel which patrols along the border. (Rep. of 
Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016) This is in line with the planned construction of 
a security-wall along the Turkish-Syrian border that is supposed to be finished in 
February 2017. (Butler/Coskun 2016) 
In response to the terror attacks in Suruç and Kilis carried out by IS in July 2015 (see 
Appendix 1), Turkey requested a meeting with all NATO members under reference to 
article four of the Washington Treaty which suggests to consult all members, if ‘(…) in 
the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of 
any of the parties is threatened.’ (North Atlantic Treaty: Art. 4) The Turkish ministry 
for foreign affairs announced this strategical step in a press release, published on their 
website on 24 July 2015, which highlights Turkey’s shift in its strategy towards IS.  
In the wake of increased security threats following the attacks against our security and 
law-enforcement forces in provinces of Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa and Kilis, in particular the 
terrorist attack that took the lives of 32 innocent Turkish citizens in Suruç on 20 July 
2015, all necessary measures are being taken and in this context, operations are also 
being carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces. (Rep. of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2015b)  
                                           
 
23 Since Turkey stepped up its fight against IS, the terror organization daily launches airstrikes against the Turkish border town of Kilis; at least 
21 people have been killed until May 2016. (Girit 2016) 
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In conclusion, it has become evident that the AKP-government has felt increasingly 
threatened due to IS-linked terror attacks, smuggling at the border and sleeper cells 
within Turkey. Yet, the security situation at the Turkish-Syrian border deteriorated 
earlier than 29 July 2015, when Turkey launched its first airstrikes against IS. In 
addition, Turkey had started to improve its measures in the border region already in 
the beginning of 2015. It can be concluded that the security threat at its border with 
Syria played a role in Turkey’s foreign policy towards IS and thus constitutes a 
necessary criterion for the outcome. However, it does not explain Turkey’s foreign 
policy shift sufficiently which is why this hypothesis passes the hoop test. 
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Pressure from the International Community −  Notably the 
USA −  Forced Turkey to Take a More Active Role in Countering IS 
The relationship between Turkey and the USA has always been marked by ups and 
downs. During the Cold War, Turkey constituted an important ally for the USA since it 
was a direct neighbour of the former Soviet Union. Especially in the first decade of the 
Cold War, Turkey directed its foreign policy towards the West. By sending troops to 
Korea, Turkey represented itself as a reliable ally and became a member of the NATO 
in 1952. In this respect, Turkey also benefited from the Marshall Plan and the Truman 
Doctrine by receiving annual aid in the amount of $160 million to equip and train its 
military forces. (International Business Publications 2015: 87)  
However, in the 1960s, the relations between the two allies cooled down, in particular 
because of the Cyprus issue.24 In order to prevent any escalation between Turkey and 
Greece, the former US-President Lyndon Johnson wrote a letter to the Turkish then-PM 
Ismet Inönü and insistently condemned any Turkish intervention in Cyprus. This crisis 
reached its climax when the USA ordered an embargo on Turkey. In response, Turkey 
closed every airbase on Turkish soil for US-military. As of the coup in 1980, the 
relation between the two allies once again started to improve. Especially under the 
Turgut Özal administration − the first elected civil government after the coup − a close 
military cooperation was built during the Kuwait-Iraq War in 1990. (Bal 2004: 119-
120) In this respect, it is important to point out Turkey’s location − territorially 
connecting Europe and the Middle East − as well as its proximity to global hotspots has 
                                           
 
24 For more information on Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus see chapter 5 of the following book: Uzer, Umut (2011), Identity and Turkish 
Foreign Policy. The Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus, London/New York.  
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always constituted a particular strategic value for the USA and the NATO. 
(Karaosmanoglu 2004: 289)  
About one month after the Suruç bombing, on 24 August 2015, Turkey joined the 
coalition’s US-led air campaign called Operation Inherent Resolve.25 In the context of 
the anti-IS coalition, Turkey launched its first airstrikes targeting IS on 28 August 
2015, which the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs commented in a press release one 
day later: ‘Our fighter aircraft, together with coalition fighter aircraft, began carrying 
out joint air operations as of yesterday evening against DEASH targets in Syria that 
also present a threat to our national security.’ (Rep. of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2015a)  
Turkey’s decision to take a more active role in the anti-IS coalition has to be seen in 
the light of Turkish-US relations. One week before Turkey stepped up its actions in the 
coalition, the US defence secretary Ashton Carter once again explicitly had called on 
Turkey to take a more active role in the fight against IS.  
They need to join the ATO [Air Tasking Order] and they need to work more on 
controlling their border. And we've made that clear. (…) Their leadership has indicated 
that this needs to be done. It's overdue, because it's a year into the campaign, but 
they're indicating some considerable effort now. (N.A 2015j)  
Since the foundation of the anti-IS coalition in September 2014, in particular the USA 
has put pressure on Turkey to intensify its fight against IS as it was also the case 
during the Cold War. Therefore, the hypothesis at hand argues that Turkey shifted its 
foreign policy strategy in countering IS due to increasing pressure from the USA, an 
ally which constitutes an important security partner for Turkey.  
In order to underpin this hypothesis, one shall take into account another example: 
Since the Syrian town of Kobane, mostly Kurdish populated, came under the control of 
IS in September 2014, Turkey faced increasing international pressure to provide more 
than humanitarian aid to refugees fleeing from Kobane. The AKP-government 
previously had refused to support YPG in their fight against IS by arguing that the 
Kurdish forces were closely linked to the PKK. In November 2014, Turkey eventually 
                                           
 
25 For further information regarding the operation visit its website: Operation Inherent Resolve. One Mission. Many Countries. 
http://www.inherentresolve.mil/, 24.10.2016. 
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led Peshmerga forces pass through Turkish territory in order to support YPG’s fight in 
Kobane. Apart from that, Turkey allowed YPG-fighters to be treated in Turkish border 
hospitals. Many scholars such as Kanat and Ustun argue that the USA put Turkey 
under massive pressure which is why the Turkish government supported Kurdish forces 
at that time. (Kanat/Ustun 2015: 92) 
The primary aim of the USA in the Syrian civil war is to combat IS, and because of this 
‘Washington now has little choice but to engage with Ankara, to ensure that Turkey’s 
south-eastern frontier ceases to serve as a jurisdiction for weapons smuggling, bulk 
cash smuggling, illegal oil sales, and the flow of fighters, to name a few.’ 
(Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 24) It is likely that in case Turkey does not cooperate in the 
required manner, the USA will consider measures such as imposing sanctions or 
ceasing military intelligence cooperation. (ibid.: 24) In an interview with CNN, the 
deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes underlined the decisive attitude of the 
USA in fighting IS: 
What I will say is now that those hostages have been released [Mosul], we would like 
to see Turkey play an active role with our coalition in taking the fight to ISIL. (…) A lot 
of these fighters who flow into and out of Iraq in Syria, they pass through Turkey. We 
want to make sure they're working with us to lock down that border as best they can, 
which is difficult given all the refugees that are flowing, and to apprehend people who 
we believe have been engaged in extremism. (CNN 2014) 
The USA is one of the most powerful states in the world and the two NATO-allies share 
a history of a constant relationship that has been mainly based on security issues. 
However, Turkey’s interest to continue this relation is also due to several other 
reasons: Firstly, in the context of various military training and education programs 
headed by the USA, the Turkish government receives annual security-related aid of 
approximately $3-5 million. Besides this, the USA is one of the major suppliers of arms 
to Turkey, which constitutes an important aspect, especially because of the increasing 
number of internal and external conflicts. These jeopardise Turkey´s national security 
and as a result contribute to its dependency on military equipment. (Thomas/Zanotti 
2016: 6) Above all, the anti-IS coalition is under the command of the USA which is 
why Turkey is in need to cooperate with its NATO-ally in order to secure its border 
from terror attacks carried out by IS. To sum up, it is arguable to conclude that Turkey 
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is highly susceptible to being influenced by the Obama-government, which may have 
shaped Turkey’s foreign policy decision to counter IS in a more effective manner.  
Although Turkey’s foreign policy mostly depends on the USA, EU and other NATO 
allies, Turkey increased significantly its economic and military self-reliance since the 
Cold War. (ibid.: 1) In the context of the Davutoğlu Doctrine, Turkey established an 
assertive foreign policy predominantly focusing on the Middle East in which sectarian 
elements became an integral part of its foreign policy strategy. Therefore, many 
Western scholars and governments feared that Turkey had distanced itself from the 
West. (Sazak/Kibaroglu 2015: 101-102) 
With regard to Turkish-US relations, the AKP-government also conducted a more 
independent foreign policy strategy towards the USA. For instance, since the onset of 
the Syrian crisis, Turkey has tried to convince the USA to intervene in Syria in order to 
establish a no-fly zone along the Turkish-Syrian border and eventually to overthrow 
the Assad-regime. (Demiryol 2015: 77-78) By insisting on that safe zone, Turkey had 
previously refused to allow the USA to launch military operations from Turkish soil. 
(Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 29). Overall, ‘[t]here have been many situations in which the 
United States and Turkey have made common cause during their decades-long alliance 
in NATO, but their strategic cooperation also has a history of complications.’ (ibid.: 21) 
The Syrian civil war once again poses a serious threat to the relationship of the two 
allies: ‘These latent tensions in the U.S.-Turkey security partnership, which were by no 
means new (…), culminated over Syria.’ (Sazak/Kibaroglu 2015: 99) 
Above all, Turkey and the USA face struggles to formulate a common perspective on 
the Syrian civil war as a whole. Turkey’s primary aims have been to bring down the 
Assad-regime and to obstruct any Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. (Park 2016: 
456) In this respect, Turkey considers the emergence of IS as an outcome of the 
broader conflict in Syria, triggered by the Assad regime, while the USA has not yet 
adopted any particular policy addressing the regime. In contrast, the USA prioritise 
countering IS and implementing a process of democratisation in the Middle East. 
(Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 24) 
As a result of their different priorities, Turkey and the USA adopt diverging strategical 
approaches: both states cooperate with different stakeholders such as Russia, Iran and 
Israel, which hampers the development of mutual trust on the very basic level. 
(Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 1) The fact that the USA maintains close relations with the 
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PKK-affiliated YPG by utilizing them as a ground force in fighting IS generates further 
tensions between the two allies. (McInnis 2016: 5) While the USA designated the PKK 
as a terror organization, the Obama-government does not consider the PYD and the 
YPG as such. (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 15) ‘For the time being, it seems that Turkey is 
going along with U.S.-PYD coordination while working with the United States on the 
creation of a save zone.’ (Kanat/Ustun 2015: 88)  
Due to the fact that the AKP-government tolerates the close relationship between the 
YPG and the USA, one can assume that Turkey favours the relation with the USA over 
the Kurdish issue. But Turkey is in a dependent relationship with the USA, an ally 
which constitutes the most important partner in security issues. Although Turkey and 
the USA at times disagree on a strategical level, and Turkey’s foreign policy agenda 
has become increasingly assertive, it has become evident that the USA played a 
significant role in Turkey’s foreign policy shift towards IS. Therefore, the hypothesis at 
hand represents a sufficient criterion for the outcome in question and passes the 
smoking gun test. 
5.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Turkey’s Shift in Countering IS Served as a Cover to Prevent 
Kurdish Expansion 
‘Two wars in Iraq have made clear to Ankara that Kurdish problems in neighbouring 
countries can all too easy spill over into Turkey.’ (Abramowitz/Edelman 2013: 25) 
During the First Iraq War in 1990, a power vacuum in northern Iraq enabled the PKK 
to lead a deadly uprising in south-eastern Turkey. As one consequence of the Iraq 
invasion in 2003, once again northern Iraq became a hotspot of Kurdish insurgency 
which spilled over into Turkish territory. According to the scholars Abramowitz and 
Edelman, the AKP-government puts such an emphasis on the Kurdish issue in the 
Syrian conflict because of its experience of the last two wars at its border to Iraq. 
(ibid.: 25) 
Due to the turmoil in the Middle East, in particular the Syrian civil war, ‘(…) the Kurdish 
issue is now out of the bottle and will constitute a major element in the region’s future 
evolution.’ (Park 2016: 452) After the Suruç bombing, Turkey has entered a two-front 
fight against the PKK and IS simultaneously. (Kanat/Ustun 2015: 90) The then-PM 
Davutoğlu defended this strategical approach and stated that ‘(…) by mounting 
operation against the Islamic State and the PKK at the same time, we also prevented 
the PKK from legitimizing itself.’ (Idiz 2015) While Turkey repeatedly targeted PKK 
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bases in south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq, the military response towards IS has 
been limited, also after Turkey took a more active role in the anti-IS coalition. 
(Bipartisan Policy Centre 2016: 1) Many scholars criticise the fact that ‘[e]ven as 
periodic IS-linked terrorist attacks and cross-border rocket attacks have killed dozens 
in Turkey in recent months, various factors contribute to Turkish leader’s continuing 
concerns about Kurdish groups and the Syrian government and its allies.’ 
(Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 29) These facts resulted in the assumption that Turkey is more 
concerned about Kurdish territorial aspirations in the border region, notably YPG, than 
about countering IS. (McInnis 2016: 5) Therefore, this hypothesis argues that the 
Turkish government utilises the fight against IS as a cover for countering the PKK and 
its Syrian allies. 
First of all, Turkey’s foreign policy strategy towards the PKK and Syria-based Kurdish 
forces has to be analysed in the context of domestic politics. After the emergence of 
the PKK in the late 1970s, the dominant state discourse has shifted from an approach 
of denial to one that regards Kurdish demands as an act of terrorism. ‘In short, 
terrorism has been the single and most important concept used in shaping Turkey’s 
perception, both domestically and internationally, of the Kurds and the Kurdish 
question.’ (Gunes/Zeydanlıoğlu 2014: 13) After two decades of armed clashes between 
the Turkish state and the PKK, a cease-fire agreement was announced in 2013 that 
eventually ended in July 2015 when tensions once again arose heavily. (Zeldin 2015: 
1)  
Not only the relation with the PKK turned into an armed conflict, but also tensions 
between the HDP and the AKP increased in the run-up to the elections. The pro-
Kurdish party repeatedly accused the AKP-government of supporting IS, and the 
government accused HDP of being affiliated with the PKK, which reflects the strained 
atmosphere during the election campaign. (N.A. 2015a) The results of the June-
elections contributed to the escalating conflict between the two political wings: The 
HDP gained a significant share of the votes − around 13 percent − and the AKP for the 
first time lost a massive share of the votes − about 9 percent. (Çarkoğlu 2015: 3)  
In early 2013, the Assad-regime withdrew from the Kurdish populated areas, and three 
geographically discontinuous cantons under the rule of the PYD emerged, collectively 
called Rojava. (see Appendix 2, Figure 1) ‘Syria’s Kurds had long been fractured, but 
the PYD soon, and surprisingly, emerged as the most organized and militarily most 
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effective of Syria’s disparate Kurdish groups.’ (Park 2016: 455) In the eyes of the 
Turkish government, the PYD and its armed wing YPG are equal to the PKK which is 
why the AKP repeatedly rose concern over the establishment of a factual PKK-
controlled area at its border with Syria. While announcing the new party programme in 
May 2016, the PM Yildirim formulated the government’s point of view towards the 
Kurdish issue by stating that ‘[t]here will be no tolerance for any illegitimate 
organization that would harm the unity of our nation, or the future of our country. (…) 
Our struggle against all terrorist organizations, in particular the separatist terrorist 
group [PKK] and parallel state [Gülen movement] will continue in a determined 
manner. (AK Parti 2016b) 
Due to its successful fight against IS, the PYD and the YPG have gained international 
recognition and support in various ways. Although the USA designated the PKK as a 
terrorist group, the Obama-government regards the YPG to be a separate organization. 
Kurdish forces became one of the closest ally for the USA in combating IS on the 
ground. In consequence, the Kurdish dimension of the Syrian conflict became the bone 
of contention between Turkey and the USA: On the one hand, the USA is hampered to 
support Turkey’s fight against the PKK; on the other hand, Turkey’s foreign policy 
strategy towards Kurdish autonomy aspirations in Syria jeopardise the unity of the 
anti-IS coalition. (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 15) Therefore, the government in Washington 
is mostly concerned that any further escalation of the conflict between the Turkish 
state and the PKK could affect its fight against IS. (Kanat/Ustun 2015: 91)  
Another crucial piece of evidence for the outcome in question might be the takeover of 
Tal Abyad by the YPG in mid-June 2015, that had been hold more than one year by IS. 
The operation was supported by Syrian rebels on the ground and by airstrikes of the 
anti-IS coalition. Gaining power over Tal Abyad has been of great strategic value for 
Kurdish forces in the northern part of Syria. ‘For the Kurds, capturing Tal Abyad allows 
them to link up the other pockets they control along the Turkish border, from Iraq in 
the east to Kobane in the west.’ (N.A. 2015e) The YPG not only connected two of its 
three cantons, but they also cut off the major supply route for IS, which was of vital 
importance for the anti-IS coalition. (see Appendix 2, Figure 1) This enabled the 
Kurdish forces to extend their territorial dominion in the Turkish border region and to 
gain international recognition. (Salih 2015: 4-5) The following statement by President 
Erdoğan clearly reflects the Turkish attitude towards the Kurdish territorial expansion: 
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‘I say to the international community that whatever the price must be paid, we will 
never allow the establishment of a new state on our southern frontier in the north of 
Syria.’ (Zalewski 2015) 
Turkey concerns the fact that its borders with Iraq, Syria and Iran are predominantly 
populated by Kurds. The government’s ‘(…) fear of a loss of its territorial integrity, 
bitterness at the PKK’s history of violence, and an elemental Turkish nationalism are all 
hard-wired into Turkish politics and society.’ (Park 2016: 452) In this respect, many 
scholars refer to the Turkish Sèvres Syndrome that still shapes Turkish foreign policy 
towards Kurdish separatism. The Treaty of Sèvres was signed in 1920 by the Western 
Allies that had conquered Istanbul and by representatives of the defeated Ottoman 
government. According to the treaty, the territory of the former Ottoman Empire was 
divided into different spheres of European influence. As a result of Atatürk’s War of 
Liberation, the Treaty of Sèvres was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 
Although the Treaty of Sèvres did not enter into force at all, the Sèvres Syndrome 
remained. The perception that unspecific foreign powers might divide Turkey along 
ethnic lines still constitutes as one of the main driving forces in Turkish politics. ‘The 
paranoid mindset has systematically been disseminated through the national education 
system and media, but also in all other spheres of society in Turkey, colouring the 
whole spectrum of political discourse.’ (Gunes/Zeydanlıoğlu 2014: 12)  
Correspondingly, since IS does not demand an autonomous region within Turkish 
territory, one may assume that the PKK poses a greater threat to the Turkish 
government. Thus, Turkey has stepped up its fight against IS as a cover for countering 
Kurdish autonomous aspirations. Yet, one can also argue in an opposite way: Since IS 
increased its terror attacks and eventually carried out one of most serious attacks on 
Turkish soil in Suruç at that time, the government might have seen IS as a foreign 
power that threatens Turkish integrity. In this case, the fight against IS has to be 
regarded independently from Turkey’s conflict with Kurdish forces.  
All in all, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict has reinflamed domestically and internationally: 
The HDP gained a substantial share of votes in the general election, the cease-fire 
between the Turkish state and the PKK collapsed and the YPG widened its territory by 
taking control over Tal Abyad. (see Appendix 1) At the same time, the international 
community, notably the USA and the NATO, exerted pressure on Turkey to take action 
in the fight against IS. In response to the Suruç bombing on 20 July 2015, the Turkish 
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government not only targeted IS, but also launched airstrikes against PKK bases. 
Following the assumption that Kurdish autonomous aspirations constitute a greater 
security threat than IS, one can assume that Turkey covered its fight against PKK/YPG 
under the guise of countering IS. According to the present state of investigation, the 
USA played a role in Turkey’s foreign policy shift towards IS as well, which is why the 
hypothesis at hand does not pass the doubly decisive test. The given evidence 
constitutes a sufficient criterion for the outcome in question and therefore, passes the 
smoking gun test.  
5.3 The Second Level of Analysis: Domestic Explanation Factors 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 4: The Turkish Government Feared an Economic Crisis due to 
the Increasing Threat of Terrorism by IS  
‘Turkey’s dilemma to fight or not to fight ISIL is also directly linked to national security 
and economic considerations.’ (Kirişci 2014) Already in 2014, many scholars such as 
Kirişci linked Turkey’s − at that time − defensive foreign policy towards IS to economic 
issues. In general, politics and economic considerations are inseparable: domestic 
markets are sensitive to their environment which is why external threats such as 
terrorist attacks can influence a state’s economy. On that account, this hypothesis 
aims at exploring to which extent the Turkish government feared an economic crisis 
that may have led to the shift in its foreign policy strategy towards IS. 
Since the AKP came to power in the early 2000s, its political success has been based 
on economic policies. The government established new regulations for the banking 
system, strengthened the fiscal discipline and boosted privatizations of state 
enterprises. All of these measures led to an increasing economic and political stability 
under the AKP-government. (Karagöl 2013: 115) The life standard of Turkey’s citizens 
improved sustainably and many small family businesses became medium-sized export-
oriented enterprises. Turkey’s success in establishing domestic stability enabled the 
AKP-government to formulate a more assertive foreign policy. In consequence, Turkey 
became more independent from its Western allies. (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 17) 
Academics such as Schanzer and Tahiroglu emphasize the point that Turkey’s 
strategical approach towards Syria as a whole have led to direct consequences on the 
domestic level. Terror attacks by IS threaten both the internal security and Turkey’s 
economy which mainly depends on foreign investment and tourism. 
(Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 3)  
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According to the Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Index from 2015, Turkey ranked 
44th out of 141 countries regarding the general competitiveness. Especially the sub-
category concerning safety and security provides an insight into the Turkish tourist 
sector in summer 2015: Turkey only achieved the 121st position out of 141 countries. 
(World Economic Forum 2015) Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey in comparison 
to other countries came off badly in these rankings due to continuing terrorist attacks 
carried out by IS. 
Yet, one also has to consider that Turkey in 2015 − as it was the case during the last 
years − reached the 6th position out of 141 countries regarding the most visited 
countries. (World Tourism Organization UNWTO 2016: 6) Beyond that, according to the 
Turkish ministry of culture and tourism, the number of arriving visitors in the second 
quarter of 2015 only dropped by 2,88 % compared to the same time period in the 
previous year 2014. (Rep. of Turkey-Ministry for Culture and Tourism 2016) Any 
interference between the tourist sector and Turkey`s strategical turn towards IS can 
be rejected by the fact, that the tourist sector did not constitute a serious threat to the 
Turkish economy.  
In many studies concerning Turkey’s style of leadership, the AKP-government including 
the Turkish President Erdoğan − although the precedency is officially nonpartisan − is 
equated with states like Russia, Iran or China. But the fact that Turkey’s economy is 
not based on natural resources and that Turkey has no access to nuclear weapons 
either distinguishes Turkey from the three other countries. (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 10) 
Moreover, ‘Turkey’s economic, political, and national security institutions and traditions 
have been closely connected with those of the West for decades.’ (ibid.: 10)  
Another important aspect is the fact that Turkey’s economic success is partly based on 
its exports to the Arab World. During the first decade of AKP’s regency, the share of 
exports to the Arab World increased from 9 to 21 percent. Exports to Syria raised from 
$250 million in 2002 to $1,8 billion in 2012. As a result of the AKP’s economic politics, 
Turkey’s GDP tripled between 2002 and 2010. Syria did not only serve as an importer 
for Turkish goods, but Turkey also used Syria as a transit country for reaching Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Since the onset of the Syrian civil war, exports to Syria 
decreased by more than 70 %. (Abramowitz/Edelman 2013: 26) One may argue that 
the AKP-government was in need to ease the conflict in Syria in order to bolster its 
exports to Syria, and that for this reason the government decided to take a more 
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active role in combating IS. By looking at the actual export rate in 2015, this 
hypothesis might be confirmed in the first place: Turkey’s export rate declined from 
about $158 billion in 2014 to around $144 billion in 2015. (Statista 2016: 27) The 
reasons for this are diverse. In order to provide an example, there is evidence that 
Turkey’s exports also suffered from structural problems and a declining demand of 
Arab countries due to falling oil prices. (Sanli 2016)  
However, the export rate alone does not mirror the overall performance of Turkey’s 
economy in 2015. In fact, the annual GDP was raising to 3,83 % in 2015 while Turkey 
only achieved a GDP of 2,9 1% in 2014, which constitutes − generally speaking − an 
economic growth. Additionally, the inflation rate shows a similar economic trend by 
decreasing from 8,86 % in 2014 to 7,67 % in 2015. (Statista 2016: 21-26) Therefore, 
it is reasonable to conclude that Turkey did not suffer from an economic crisis although 
its trade with states in the Middle East was hampered by the ongoing crisis in Iraq and 
Syria. This fact can be explained by different approaches: Either the Middle East is not 
as important as assumed for Turkey’s economic growth or Turkey had reorganized its 
export structures. The hypothesis at hand cannot be confirmed and therefore this fact 
will not be considered further. The analysis has shown that there is no link between 
Tukey’s economic performance in 2015 and the turn in its foreign policy towards IS. 
Since Turkey did not fear an economic crisis, this hypothesis fails the hoop test and 
can be regarded as eliminated.  
5.3.2 Hypothesis 5: Turkish Public Demanded a Shift in Turkey’s IS-Policy 
‘It should be assumed that oppositions can potentially occur in any type of regime and 
influence foreign policy – regardless of the regime’s accountability or other aspects of 
its formal structural arrangements. (Hagan 1995b: 342) According to a survey of 2015 
conducted by the Kadir Has University regarding social and political trends in Turkey, 
86 % of the participants perceived IS as a terrorist organisation and 78 % considered 
IS as a threat for Turkey’s security. The survey also has shown that around 54 % of 
the interviewees suggested that Turkey should conduct direct airstrikes against IS. In 
contrast, only 18,9 % of the participants rejected active responses in countering IS. 
(Kadir Has University 2015: 10-11) Since the Suruç bombing was the most serious 
attack by IS on Turkish soil at that time and the Turkish society regarded the Islamist 
organisation as a threat to Turkey’s security, the hypothesis at hand argues that the 
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Turkish government had shifted its foreign policy strategy towards IS due to domestic 
demands. 
As the first piece of evidence, a wave of prosecutions of Turkey-based IS supporters 
took place in July 2015. (see Appendix 1) Special police forces raided 24 different 
houses and shops of suspected IS-fighters in 19 different Turkish cities. These series of 
raids constitute a turning point in Turkey’s strategy towards IS also on the domestic 
level. (Stein 2015) On that account, one may argue that the AKP-government had 
started those investigations due to an increasing pressure from the Turkish public. 
Another survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund shall give an insight into the 
Turkish society’s attitude towards IS. Only 29 % of the respondents supported the idea 
that Turkish troops should establish a buffer zone along the Turkish-Syria. More 
specifically, 35 % of the participants were in favour of such a buffer zone to protect the 
Syrian opposition from the Assad regime and 37 % of the responders would agree to a 
buffer zone if the aim was preventing a Kurdish autonomous region. Although the 
majority of the Turkish public refused the creation of a buffer zone in general terms, a 
plurality of 47 % favour the idea of sending troops to establish such a zone in order to 
protect the inhabitants in the region from IS. (German Marshall Fund 2015: 10) 
Consequently, it has become evident that the Turkish society regards IS as the main 
threat within the turmoil of the Syrian civil war, which supports the hypothesis at 
hand.  
In the aftermath of the Suruç bombing, nationwide anti-government protests erupted 
in Istanbul and in predominantly Kurdish populated areas such as Diyarbakir, Mardin, 
Adiyaman, and Mersin. During the protests, 24 people were injured including eleven 
Turkish security personnel. According to the state-run Anadolu Agency, the police 
detained 51 protesters and seized various heavy arms such as petrol bombs, bullets 
and fireworks. Already in the past, fragments of Turkish society such as left-wing 
parties and NGOs as well as PKK-sympathisers had suspected the AKP-government of 
supporting IS. During the rallies, the protesters explicitly accused the government of 
being responsible for the Suruç bombing and expressed their demands by remarks 
such as Murderous ISIL, collaborator AKP. (N.A. 2015d). The Suruç bombing not only 
led to a politicized discourse in public because it was carried out by IS, but also 
because the victims of the bombing were a group of pro-Kurdish activists that had 
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planned to travel to Syria in order to help with the reconstruction of the Syrian town of 
Kobane. (Salih 2015: 4) 
Taking together these facts, one may favour the given hypothesis. Yet, the factual 
scope of shaping the decision-making process is restricted by the current AKP-
government. Following the approach of Ripsman, in times of an external threat, 
political leaders tend to neglect domestic politics under the premise of the overall aim 
to secure the survival of the state. (Rispman 2009: 186-187) In this sense, it is 
questionable to which extent members of the legislative and domestic actors are able 
to express their demands.  
On a legal basis, the Turkish constitution provides a democratic multi-party system. To 
which extent the legislative is able to influence foreign policy decisions is reflected by 
an example of the recent past when the Turkish parliament rejected the request from 
the USA to enter Iraq through Turkish soil in 2003. (Eligür 2006: 3) Although the 
current Turkish parliament consists of four different parties, the AKP predominantly 
controls the discussions in parliament which is why the scope of participation of non-
AKP parliamentarians is limited. (Gumuscu/Keyman 2014: 57) 
The same applies to media and CSOs as explored above in the fourth chapter of this 
thesis. Already in 2009, the scholar Walker argued that Erdoğan and the AKP began to 
use their foreign policy agenda to placate domestic opposition: The AKP focused mainly 
on the EU accession process in order to expand its domestic support and to counter its 
opponents. (Walker 2009: 9) Seven years later, in 2016, Freedom House argued in a 
similar but harsher way and concluded that the AKP-government ‘(…) aggressively 
used the penal code, criminal defamation legislation, and the country’s antiterrorism 
law to punish critical reporting, and journalists faced growing violence, harassment, 
and intimidation from both state and non-state actors during the year.’ (Freedom 
House 2016) In the aftermath of the Gezi protests in 2013, the AKP’s authoritarian 
tendencies increased, which has contributed to an atmosphere of political polarization 
in Turkish society. (Göğüş/Mannitz 2016: 19) The EC agrees to this point and states 
that ‘[a]fter several years of progress, serious backsliding has been seen over the past 
two years.’ (European Commission 2015: 22) 
Against this background, it is difficult to evaluate whether a majority of Turkish society 
favoured a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy strategy towards IS. For instance, while 
reporting about the terror attack in Suruç, none of the most common newspapers 
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(Hürriyet, Sabah, Vatan)26 have called on a change in Turkey’s foreign policy strategy 
towards IS. (N.A. 2015g, N.A. 2015h, N.A. 2015i) The Turkish media sector is highly 
concentrated and to a certain extent controlled by the government, which is why 
domestic actors are hardly able to express their demands on a democratic basis if it is 
not in line with the AKP’s polices. (Corke/Finkel/Kramer et. al. 2014: 13) The analysis 
at hand cannot evaluate in a final manner if the public did not demand such as a shift 
or if the newspapers did not publish it. With regard to the limited freedom of speech in 
Turkey, this aspect does not provide a conclusive argument for the outcome in 
question. In this context, one may argue that also the protests after the Suruç 
bombing could have been larger, yet, the AKP-government takes a variety of measures 
to prevent future protests. This ranges from installing restrictions on social media or 
harsh police action to criminal prosecutions against government-critics. 
(Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 9)  
Due to the AKP’s single-party majority in parliament, the party has consolidated a 
centrum of power in which Erdoğan plays the leading role. After the presidential 
elections in 2014, international scholars argued that Erdoğan ‘(…) claimed a mandate 
for increasing his power by pursuing a presidential system of governance.’ (ibid.: 8) 
Apart from that, the AKP’s style of leadership is highly discussed: ‘Turkey today looks 
less like a liberal European democracy and more like the kind of one-man autocracy 
commonly found in the Middle East’. (Cook 2015) These authoritarian tendencies are 
also visible in the government’s rhetoric. In the aftermath of the Suruç bombing, the 
Turkish government commented on the terror attacks in a press release on 24 July 
2015, as follows:  
While the wounds caused by the abhorrent terror attack that has claimed the lives of 
32 of our citizens on July 20 are still fresh, the DEASH terrorist organization carried out 
an armed attack on July 23 against our troops assigned to a military-border post at 
Elbeyli, martyring a non-commissioned office. (Rep. of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2015a)  
                                           
 
26 This assumption is based on my own newspaper-research. Special attention was paid to the three newspapers Hürriyet, Sabah and Vatan be-
cause all of them represent different political opinions. As widely known, Hürriyet favours the AKP but not as much as Sabah supports the gov-
ernmental party. In contrast, the newspaper Vatan is in line with CHP.  
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By using the term martyring, the Turkish government indicates that the soldier who 
was killed in the border region by IS fighters sacrificed himself for the Turkish state. 
Following this logic, the unity of the state is more important than a soldier’s life. It 
represents a rhetorical language tool that is mostly used in non-democratic states.  
After the failed coup attempt on 16 July 2016, the Turkish government expanded its 
policy of state intervention and, in result, thousands of personnel from civil service 
have been detained or dismissed. These measures also included the closures of various 
Gülen-suspected businesses, schools and media outlets which underlines the 
assumption that the AKP-government became increasingly authoritarian. 
(Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 12)  
In fact, the more the AKP-government rules in an authoritarian way, the less civil 
society can influence foreign policy decisions. It is difficult to explore to which extent 
domestic actors have demanded a shift in foreign policy towards IS. However, it is to 
be assumed that domestic constraints have not caused the change in Turkey’s strategy 
which is why the hypothesis at hand fails the hoop test.  
5.3.3 Hypothesis 6: The AKP-Government Stepped Up its Fight against IS in Or-
der to Receive Domestic Support for the General Elections  
The scholar Soli Özel links the shift in Turkish foreign policy towards IS to domestic 
politics. ‘The real aim here has more to do with domestic politics than foreign policy. 
Foreign policy continues to provide capital for the government in terms of domestic 
politics at a time when the country is heading for elections.’ (Idiz 2015) Compared to 
the general elections in 2011, the AKP lost around nine percentage points in the June-
elections. Although the AKP remained the strongest force in the parliament with almost 
41 % share of the votes, they did not receive the necessary majority to rule in form of 
a single-party government. (Çarkoğlu 2015: 3) Moreover, the AKP also did not reach 
the necessary majority in order to transform the Turkish system into a presidential 
system that had constituted the greatest aim during the election campaign. (Seufert 
2014: 4) As illustrated in the given timeline, on 24 August 2015, the Turkish President 
Erdoğan declared that no coalition could be formed and called for fresh elections in 
November of the same year. By considering the fact that Turkey launched its first 
airstrikes in the framework of the anti-IS coalition on 28 August 2015, one may 
presume a connection between those two events. (see Appendix 1) The hypothesis at 
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hand argues that the Turkish government expanded its actions in the fight against IS 
with the aim to receive greater support in the re-elections of November.  
Since the AKP came to power in 2002, the Islam-conservative party received the 
majority in the parliament with improving results in each election. With regard to the 
loss of share of votes in the June-elections, it can be assumed that the AKP-
government has faced domestic constraints during its last term in office. This electoral 
loss can be traced back to an increasing political polarization in Turkish society. 
Nationwide anti-government protests that erupted in the Gezi Park in 2013 and a 
corruption scandal involving key figures of the current government in the same year 
enhanced the process of domestic polarization in Turkey. (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 8) 
Under the pre-hegemonic rule of the AKP, traditional-religious fragments of society 
have replaced the long-lasting domination of modernist in the centre-periphery 
conflict. As a result of the rapid modernization of economy, the traditional-religious 
part of society gained increasingly wealth. (Erdoğan 2016: 3) A new line of conflict 
emerged and led to a deep rift in Turkish society: 
Being either for or against the AKP has become a central point for political 
identification over the past decade, and it has created a tense atmosphere in Turkish 
society. This phenomenon contributed to triggering the Gezi Park demonstrations and 
also accounts for their quick transformation from a protest concerning environmental 
issues into a site of much greater political salience. (Göğüş/Mannitz 2016: 20) 
The survey Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey, a project of the German Marshall 
Fund, mirrors the alarming degree of polarization in Turkish society. The fact that 
83 % do not want their daughter to marry somebody who votes for the opposing party 
and that 74 % dislike the idea of their children playing with other children whose 
parents vote for another party reflects the public polarization in its core. (Erdoğan 
2016: 2) The high polarization is also present during political campaigns in which most 
politicians use a discriminatory discourse in order to underline their arguments. (ibid.: 
3)  
The scholars Thomas and Zanotti from the American Congressional Research Service 
emphasize two main aspects in terms of Turkey’s economical and societal development 
under the AKP-government. On the one hand, Turkey has improved its economic 
performance and has shifted from a military-guided leadership to a more civilian-led 
system that reflects the newly growing middle classes interests. On the other hand, 
A N N E  B U N N E N B E R G       
 
74 | 
 
GET MA WP 14/2018 
‘(…) many Turkish citizens and outside observers express concern that Erdoğan and 
the AKP have taken Turkey in a more authoritarian direction and are seeking to 
consolidate their hold in power.’ (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 8)  
In order to retain political power, the AKP is in need to gain electoral support and 
therefore has to mobilize its voters by increasing the party’s popularity. Appealing to 
nationalism, emphasizing the party’s special capacity or distracting from domestic 
problems are the most applied strategies in the dynamic of mobilization according to 
Hagan. Governments tend to manipulate foreign policy issues with the aim to decrease 
political polarization one the one hand and to create a public collective on the other 
hand. ‘Foreign policy is a correspondingly viable means for unifying the public and 
discrediting domestic adversaries.’ (Hagan 1995a: 130) Therefore, one may argue that 
the AKP has changed its approach towards IS in order to distract from the increasing 
public polarization and to gain electoral support by focusing on an external threat such 
as IS. According to a survey by the Turkish Kadir Has University from 2015, 86 % of 
the interviewees perceive IS as a terrorist organisation and 78 % of the participants 
consider IS as a threat to Turkey’s security. (Kadir Has University 2015: 10) 
Concentrating on the fight against IS in times when the country is heading for 
elections may have provided an efficient political tool for the Turkish government.  
Since the Turkish government entered a fight on two fronts – IS and PKK − it might be 
fruitful to analyse which role the Kurdish issue has played during the election 
campaign. Internationally, PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups continuously took control over 
large areas along the Turkish-Syrian border. On the domestic level, in the June-
elections, the HDP gained a substantial share of votes whereas the AKP lost massive 
share of the votes. (Çarkoğlu 2015: 3) In the run-up to the November-elections, 
Turkish politics were affected by armed clashes between Turkish forces and the PKK on 
the on hand and terror attacks by IS on the other hand. (see Appendix 1)  
These growing tensions have contributed to a nationalistic rhetoric by the Turkish 
President Erdoğan and AKP-officials who increasingly criticised the HDP and other 
Kurdish groups in public sphere. In the repeated elections in November, the AKP 
regained the absolute majority with 49,5 share of the votes. Electoral analyses have 
shown that a significant number of voters have shifted from HDP and MHP in the June-
elections to the AKP in November. Despites their electoral losses, both opposition 
parties passed the 10 % threshold and remained in the parliament. (ibid.: 1-3) The 
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scholars Thomas and Zanotti conclude that ‘[t]he return to violence helped Erdoğan in 
the short term, with some Kurds presumably moving back to the AKP from the HDP in 
November 2015 elections because of the PKK’s return to the conflict.’ (Thomas/Zanotti 
2016: 15) 
In the context of the anti-IS coalition, the Turkish government intensified its fight 
against IS at the end of August 2015. Already in July the AKP-government had allowed 
the USA to carry out airstrikes from Turkish airbases. In fact, the change in Turkish 
foreign policy took place earlier than August when Erdoğan called for fresh elections, 
which weakens the hypothesis slightly. (see Appendix 1) Above all, not only the fight 
against IS, but also the Kurdish issue played a role during the election campaign. All 
the given events and facts seem to be in a direct connection with the election 
campaign. Yet, the body of evidence does not prove to which extent the election 
campaign is linked to the shift in Turkish foreign policy. The hypothesis constitutes 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for the outcome in question. All in all, the 
hypothesis at hand passes the straw-in-the-wind test and provides valuable 
information for the outcome in question.  
6. Conclusion 
Turkish foreign policy towards IS provides a fruitful case study in order to understand 
the relation between domestic politics, the international system, and foreign policy. In 
the investigation whether domestic politics or external factors have caused the shift in 
Turkey’s foreign policy strategy towards IS, three hypotheses from each level of 
analysis – domestic and international – were tested in the context of PT. 
At first, it can be concluded that the government neither feared an economic crisis nor 
has changed its foreign policy strategy due to public demands. These two hypotheses 
did not provide necessary evidence for the outcome in question which is why both fail 
the hoop test and therefore can be eliminated in the process of explaining Turkey’s 
foreign policy shift. 
As a second finding, it can be assumed that the (then)upcoming elections have played 
a role in Turkey’s decision to expand its fight against IS. During the election campaign, 
the AKP was mostly promoting the introduction of a presidential system for which they 
did not receive the sufficient percentage of votes in the June-elections. One reason for 
this is a rising political polarization within Turkish society that has evoked new social 
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cleavages. (Çarkoğlu 2015: 4) It can be concluded that Turkey has utilized its fight 
against IS as a tool − in the sense of formulating a common enemy − for improving its 
results in the November-elections. The analysis of this hypothesis has also given 
evidence that the election campaign was partly influenced by the Kurdish issue. 
Although this hypothesis constitutes neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion, it 
provides a certain explanatory power to pass the straw-in-the wind-test.   
Thirdly, it has become evident that the security threat at the Turkish-Syrian 
contributed to Turkey’s strategical shift towards IS. Many statements of Turkish 
officials proved that security concerns played a crucial role in their policy-making 
towards IS. However, border activities such as smuggling, the high number of foreign 
fighters travelling to Syria and military spill-overs have already taken place since the 
onset of the Syrian civil war. Therefore, this hypothesis cannot explain Turkey’s foreign 
policy shift after the Suruç bombing in a sufficient manner and should rather be 
regarded as a precondition for the outcome in question. It only provides a necessary 
criterion for the phenomenon at hand and consequently passes the hoop test.  
As the main result, two of the given hypotheses pass the smoking-gun test. In the first 
place, it is reasonable to conclude that the Turkish government evaluates Kurdish 
autonomy aspirations as a greater security threat than IS, which is why the AKP 
expanded its fight against IS as a cover for countering PKK/YPG. In contrast to 
Turkey’s approach in countering IS, the Turkish government did not hesitate to take 
military action against Kurdish bases. In addition, many scholars claim that Turkey has 
launched more airstrikes against PKK/YPG bases than IS. (Bipartisan Policy Center 
2016: 1) Yet, these aspects do not confirm the hypothesis in a final manner due to 
various reasons. In the context of the anti-IS coalition, the allies launch airstrikes 
against the terror militia in a common approach. To which extent a member of the 
anti-IS coalition contributes to the fight cannot simply be measured by the number of 
launched airstrikes. Besides military assistance, the Turkish government also provides 
access to several airbases and took measures to protect its border from the flow of 
terroristic forces. The given items of evidence do not prove that Turkey would have 
acted differently towards IS if Kurdish autonomy aspirations would not pose a security 
threat to the Turkish state. Therefore, this hypothesis cannot pass the doubly-decisive 
test and rather provides a sufficient criterion for the outcome in question and passes 
the smoking-gun test. 
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The question still remains why Turkey was in need to cover its fight against Kurdish 
autonomy aspirations. This can be explained by the second hypothesis that passes the 
smoking-gun test: Pressure from the international community − notably the USA − 
forced Turkey to take a more active role in countering IS. Since the emergence of the 
terror militia, the Obama-administration constantly has put pressure on Turkey to 
increase its role in the anti-IS coalition. The analysis has shown that the USA 
constitutes Turkey’s most important long-standing partner in security issues. For 
instance, the USA is one of the major suppliers of arms to Turkey and provides annual 
security-related aid to Turkey. (Thomas/Zanotti 2016: 6). However, with the 
implementation of the Davutoğlu Doctrine, Turkey applied an assertive foreign policy 
strategy: The AKP-government has highly criticized the close relationship between the 
USA and the YPG which became the bone of contention between the two NATO-allies. A 
statement by the Turkish President Erdoğan regarding the planed Raqqa-offensive 
reflects Turkey’s attitude. ‘Of course, if the United States wants to do the Raqqa 
operation with the PYD and YPG, we as Turkey will not take part in this operation. But 
if they exclude the PYD and YPG from this affair, then of course we can join this 
struggle together with the United States.’ (Idiz 2016) Although Turkey might be not as 
dependent as assumed, the analysis has shown that the USA shaped Turkey’s foreign 
policy towards IS in a sufficient manner, which is why this hypothesis passes the 
smoking-gun test. 
In conclusion, Turkey’s strategical shift was caused by both the USA and the Kurdish 
issue. By countering IS in cooperation with the USA, Turkey ensured its relationship 
with its Western allies. At the same time, the fight against IS allows Turkey to combat 
the YPG on Syrian ground while avoiding any conflict with the USA, which is allied with 
the YPG. In combating PKK/YPG and IS simultaneously, the Turkish government is able 
to counter its security threat at its borders with Iraq and Syria. As only one side effect, 
this strategical approach enabled the AKP to improve its results in the November-
elections.  
In order to underscore these research findings, one should take into account Turkey’s 
current approach in fighting IS and PKK/YPG. In response to an IS-linked terrorist 
attack at a Kurdish wedding in the Turkish city of Gaziantep on 20 August 2016, 
Turkey announced to take measures in order to withdraw IS from its border. A few 
days later, Turkey carried out the military operation Euphrates Shield with support 
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from the USA and Turkey-backed FSA-fighters. This operation has been the largest 
military intervention on Syrian soil so far: Turkey sent tanks, planes and ground forces 
into Jarabulus, the last remaining IS-held city at the border. (Shaheen 2016) However, 
many scholars argue that the main objective is to counter recent Kurdish expansion in 
that region instead of combating IS. (N.A. 2016d) Already in a meeting on 29 June 
2015, the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) had announced that any incursion in 
the west of the Euphrates River was regarded as a violation of its red line that would 
be countered by a military cross-border operation. (N.A. 2015f) The YPG crossed that 
red line in August 2016 by taking control of Manbij in a US-backed military operation 
against IS. This step empowered the YPG to move towards Jarabulus, whose conquest 
eventually could help Kurdish forces to link their three cantons. (see Appendix 2, 
Figure 2) In fact, the Turkish military not only targeted IS but also YPG forces which 
raised concern of US-authorities: ‘We want to make clear that we find these clashes − 
in areas where ISIL is not located − unacceptable and a source of deep concern’, said 
Brett McGurk, US special envoy for the fight against IS. (N.A. 2016d)  
In summary, the analysis has given evidence that the shift in Turkish foreign policy 
was mainly caused by external factors. The security issue constitutes the main driving 
force in Turkish foreign policy which is in line with the realists’ assumption that security 
is one of the most important factors in formulating a foreign policy strategy. ‘Realist 
theory claims that security is more important than economics and economics is more 
important than, say, human rights.’ (Durfee/Rosenau 2000: 15) It is important to point 
out that the Kurdish dimension is not purely a foreign policy issue. As described in the 
prior analysis, Turkish interests in countering PYD/YPG are closely linked to the Kurdish 
issue on the domestic level. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that domestic aspects 
have shifted Turkey’s foreign policy strategy as well.  
In general terms, the analysis demonstrated that due to restricted freedom of speech, 
Turkish media and interest groups are not able to carry out their duties on a 
democratic basis. The fact that the AKP-government increasingly oppresses dissenting 
opinions implies that the current government faces domestic constraints. With regard 
to the theoretical approach of Hagan, one can conclude that domestic politics influence 
Turkish foreign policy decisions in an indirect way. Yet, due to the limited scope and a 
lack of reliable data in this field, the thesis at hand only represents a brief insight into 
domestic politics in Turkey. Further research is needed in order to explore to which 
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extent domestic actors are able to influence the government’s decision making-process 
in spite of its authoritarian tendencies. 
Above all, it is crucial to point out that the domestic level and the international system 
are hardly separable from each other in terms of exploring a state’s foreign policy 
decision. Although it is to be assumed that external factors dominated the decision-
making process in the given case study, domestic politics played a vital role in Turkey’s 
foreign policy shift towards IS as well. The Turkish government can be regarded as 
increasingly authoritarian in its style of leadership, yet, domestic constraints remain. 
By applying realism and liberalism in explaining foreign policy decisions, it might be 
fruitful not only to focus on their differences, but also to explore their similarities. The 
analysis has shown that there is no clear boundary between domestic politics and 
external factors. None of the hypotheses has passed the doubly-decisive test, thus, 
further research that includes the results of the thesis at hand will be needed to 
explain the outcome in question in a final manner. 
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Appendix 1: Timeline  
 
 
Domestic Politics 
 
 
International System 
 
 
Foreign Policy 
 
2011 
 
June 
AKP wins parliamentary election 
for the third time 
March 
pro-democracy protests lead to a 
civil war in Syria 
October  
Turkey hosts and establishes the 
Syrian National Council (SNC) in 
Istanbul 
 
2012 
 
Throughout the year 
AKP-government increasingly bans 
Twitter, YouTube and Facebook  
 October 3 
Syrian mortar fire kills five civilians 
at Turkish border 
à parliament authorises military 
action inside Syria, Turkish forces 
respond with artillery fire into 
Syria 
 
2013 
 
March 
announcement of cease-fire 
agreement between the Turkish 
state and the PKK  
 
May-August 
Gezi protest leads to nationwide 
anti-government demonstrations  
 
December 17 
key members of the government 
are involved in a corruption 
scandal  
February 
Operation Active Fence: NATO 
installs missile defence system at 
Turkish-Syrian border  
 
July 3 
Egyptian President Morsi is 
overthrown in military coup  
 
 
 
November 
Turkish President Erdoğan asks 
Russia to become a member in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO)  
à tensions with Western allies 
increase 
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2014 
 
March 20 
IS-members kill three security 
personnel at a checkpoint close to 
Niğde 
 
August  
Erdoğan wins presidential elections 
 
October 2 
Turkish parliament gives authority 
to the government for sending 
military to Iraq or Syria  
à also allows foreign military to 
operate in Turkey 
 
December  
police raids media outlets close to 
Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen and 
arrests 24 journalists  
January/February 
YPG establishes an interim 
administration in northern Syria 
 
June 
IS proclaims the establishment of 
a caliphate 
 
June 11 
IS captures Turkish embassy in 
Iraq and takes 49 people as 
hostages 
 
September 5 
USA introduces anti-IS coalition, 
Turkey becomes one of the 
founding members 
 
September 13 
IS takes control over Kobane 
 
September 24 
President Erdoğan joins US-chaired 
Security Council meeting on 
foreign terrorist fighters  
November 21 
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden 
meets with then-PM Davutoğlu in 
order to discuss Turkey's role in 
the anti-IS coalition 
 
December 
all members of the anti-IS coalition 
agree to the five lines of efforts  
 
2015 
 
June 5 
IS-suspected terror attack: four 
people die and more than 100 are 
injured during a rally in Diyarbakır 
by supporters of the HDP 
 
Mid-June 
YPG takes control over the Syrian 
town of Tal Abyad 
 
July 28 
meeting of all NATO-members 
June 23 
meeting between Turkey and the 
EU regarding a common strategy 
in counterterrorism  
 
July 24 
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June 7 
HDP clears 10 % threshold at 
parliamentary election, AKP loses 
its majority  
 
 
July 11 
PKK announces end of cease-fire 
 
July 20 
IS-suspected suicide bomber kills 
32 young activists at rally in Suruç 
 
July 22 
PKK claims responsibility for death 
of two Turkish policemen in 
Ceylanpinar  
 
July 23 
IS-fighters kill Turkish soldier at 
border outpost in Kilis 
 
July/August 
prosecutions of IS supporters, a 
wave of raids took place 
 
August 24 
Erdoğan calls for fresh elections for 
November 
 
October 10 
during a pro-Kurdish peace rally in 
Ankara 102 people die in twin 
suicide bomb attack died 
à Turkey accuses IS 
àKurdish groups accuse the 
government 
 
November 1 
AKP regains parliamentary 
majority in re-elections 
 
after Turkey’s request 
 
Turkey and the USA sign a deal to 
open several airbases to the anti-
IS coalition  
 
 
 
 
July 24 
operation Yalçın Nane: Turkey 
carries out airstrikes against IS 
headquarters without entering 
Syrian airspace 
 
July 26 
Turkey calls for a NATO-meeting 
by referring to Art. 4 of the 
Washington Treaty 
 
July 29 
Turkey launches airstrikes against 
IS for the first time, 
simultaneously carries out 
airstrikes against PKK 
 
August 24 
Turkey fully joins the coalition’s air 
campaign Operation Inherent 
Resolve 
 
August 28 
Turkey launches airstrikes 
targeting IS in the context of the 
anti-IS coalition 
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Appendix 2: Figures of Syrian Territories 
Figure 1: Syrian Territory Under Control of Kurdish Forces 
 
Figure 1: Cerha, Birgit (2015), Kurden: Immer noch die Weisen des Universums, 
online: http://ifamo -blog.blogspot.de/2015/03/kurden-immer-noch-die-waisen-
des.html, 03.11.2016. 
Figure 2: The Territory West of the Euphrates River 
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Figure 2: N.A. 2015f, Turkey Says West of Euphrates Red Line in Northern Syria, 
online: http://www.trworld.com//turkey-says-west-euphrates-red-line-northern-syria-
3972, 10.11.2016. 
Appendix 3: Glossary 
Anti-IS Coalition 
In September 2015, US-President Barack Obama officially announced the introduction 
of an international anti-IS coalition. As of April 2016, all 66 participants have joined 
the coalition and contribute either militarily or by providing resources to the coalition. 
At a meeting in December 2014, all participants agreed to work along five lines of 
effort. Each line of effort is headed by at least two countries that are in charge of 
coordinating the cooperation between the participating countries. The lines of effort 
include 1) supporting military operations, led by the United States and Iraq, 2) 
combating the flow of foreign fighters, led by the Netherlands and Turkey, 3) cutting 
off IS’ financing options, led by Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United 
States, 4) addressing humanitarian aid, led by Germany and the United Arab Emirates 
and 5) exploring IS’ characteristics, led by the United Arab Emirates, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. (McInnis 2016: 1) 
Free Syrian Army (FSA)  
In the beginning of the Syrian civil war, deserters from the Syrian army formed the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) and claimed the leadership over the armed opposition forces. 
Yet, most local armed groups did not recognize the authority of the FSA. 
(Blanchard/Humud/Nikitin 2016: 4-5) The FSA was one of the first opposition forces 
that sought to defeat the Assad-regime. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, 
Turkey has supported the FSA and other oppositional groups. For instance, already in 
October 2011, Turkey hosted and established the Syrian National Council in Istanbul 
that should unite the disparate Syrian opposition factions. (Schanzer/Tahiroglu 2014: 
9) Apart from that, the Turkish government provided weapons and a safe haven on 
Turkish territory with the long-term aim to overthrow the Assad-Regime. (Ayata 2014: 
104)  
Kurds 
Kurds constitute the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East after Arabs, Persians 
and Turks. In the aftermath of First World War, the Kurdish people did not receive 
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their own state and instead settled down mostly in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. 
Therefore, Kurds are regarded as the world’s largest contiguously located ethnic group 
without a state of their own. The Kurdish population in the Middle East is estimated to 
range between 30 and 40 million, half of which are located in Turkey, where they 
constitute approximately 20 % of all inhabitants. (Park 2016: 450-451) Most of ethnic 
Kurds − around 75 % − are Sunni Muslims. The second largest group belongs to 
Alevism, most common in central Anatolia, followed by Shiites in Iran. (McDowall 
2007: 10) Any Kurdish aspiration of self-determination has been opposed by most 
states in the Middle East. In the case of Turkey, Kurdish ethnicity has been denied 
since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 under Mustafa Atatürk. 
(Gunes/Zeydanlıoğlu 2014: 13) 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)  
The Kurdish Regional Government was officially established in July 1992; the first 
elections in May 1993. The Iraqi constitution, introduced in 1992, recognizes the 
Kurdistan Autonomous Region with its government and legislations as a federal state 
within the Iraqi system. Until the Iraq invasion in 2003, the region was marked by 
armed clashes between the two big Kurdish parties. The KRG’s military forces, called 
Peshmerga, are allied with Western powers in combating IS on the ground. 
(Dougherty/Ghareeb 2013: 384) Since the 2010s, the KRG has built strong economic 
and political ties with Turkey under the AKP-government. Especially energy politics 
have become the main dynamic that drives the relation between Turkey and the KRG. 
It is predicted that the area belonging to the KRG contains 45 billion barrels of oil and 
100-200 billion cubic meters of natural gas; the exploitation of its natural resources 
constitutes the KRG’s main source of income. (Balci 2014: 13)  
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) 
The PKK was formed in the late 1970s by radical students in Ankara under the 
leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. In November 1978, the Kurdish group adopted the 
name of PKK and, unlike other Kurdish groups at that time, officially introduced a 
political agenda promoting Kurdish identity and nationalism. (Tucker 2016: 319) 
Although the PKK’s leader Öcalan has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1998, the 
organization’s ideology is based on a cult of personality around Öcalan. (Radu 2006: 
97) By capturing several villages in 1984, the PKK for the first time carried out an 
armed campaign with the overall demand to establish an independent Kurdish state 
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within Turkey. From the 1990s onwards, the PKK started to focus on bombing 
governmental institutions and attacking tourists in hotels and restaurants. (Romano 
2006: 123-124) Since its foundation, the relation between the Turkish state and the 
PKK has been marked by periods of armed clashes taking place especially in the south-
east of Turkey.  
The cease-fire agreement achieved in 2013 between the Turkish government and the 
PKK collapsed in July 2015 when tensions once again increased heavily. (Zeldin 2015: 
1) The successful role of Kurdish forces in combating IS complicated Turkey’s relation 
with the PKK. (Salih 2015: 1-2) 
Kurdish Democratic Party (PYD) 
The Syrian-based Kurdish Democratic Party was founded in 2013 and is widely 
regarded as being affiliated with the PKK. Already in 2015, the party’s leader Saleh 
Muslim Mohammed officially declared that they did not support the Assad Regime. 
(Blanchard/Humud/Nikitin 2016: 40) The three predominantly Kurdish populated 
enclaves in northern Syria (Jazira, Kobane and Afrin), called Rojava, are controlled by 
the PYD. In the beginning of 2014, the PYD established an interim administration in 
these areas. Against this background, the party introduced councils, courts, and police 
forces. Many scholars and activists such as Human Rights Watch accuse the PYD of 
violating human rights by forced resettlements, arbitrary arrests, targeted killings and 
the use of children in their military forces. (Human Rights Watch 2014) Unlike the PKK, 
neither the PYD nor the YPG is designated as a terrorist organisation by the USA and 
the EU. On a military level, the USA maintains close ties with the PYD with the purpose 
to fight IS on the ground. Ideologically, similar to the PKK, the PYD regards the 
founder of PKK, Abudallah Öcalan, as their main source of inspiration and in this sense, 
supports the overall aim to establish governance structures in Kurdish regions. Yet, the 
YPG mainly focuses on the establishment of an autonomous region by linking the three 
enclaves in the northern part of Syria. (Salih 2015: 1-2)  
Popular Protection Units (YPG) 
The YPG is a secular militia coalition affiliated with the PYD and consists of mostly 
Kurdish fighters. Their military operations focus on consolidating power in the region 
along the Turkish-Syrian border in order to establish a territorial corridor that ranges 
from Syria to Iraq, called Rojava. (Salih 2015: 5) Its size is uncertain, but 
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approximately fifty thousand fighters belong to the YPG, including Assyrian, Armenian, 
Circassian and Arab sub-units. The Kurdish forces YPG played a decisive role in fighting 
IS, for instance by conquering the IS-held cities Kobane and Al Abyad, located at the 
Turkish borderline. (Blanchard/Humud/Nikitin 2016: 40) On a military level, the USA 
and other Western countries support and cooperate with the Kurdish forces. Due to the 
fact that the PYG represents one of the most successful partners on the ground in 
northern Syria, it has become a key ally to the anti-IS coalition. (Salih 2015: 4) 
 
 
 
 
